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EXPERT EVIDENCE AND THE 
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE AFTER 
CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON 
Jennifer L. Mnookin* 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2004, in the landmark case of Crawford v. Washington,1 
the Supreme Court dramatically transformed its approach to the 
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, which guarantees 
to criminal defendants the right to confront witnesses against 
them.2 Prior to Crawford, rather little hearsay evidence was held 
to violate the Confrontation Clause. The previous framework for 
evaluating the Confrontation Clause, put into place by the 1980 
decision in Ohio v. Roberts,3 permitted the use of hearsay in 
criminal cases under the Confrontation Clause so long as the 
evidence either fell into a “firmly rooted” hearsay exception, or 
bore “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”4 As the 
jurisprudence developed, nearly all of the hearsay exceptions 
were pronounced by the courts to be “firmly rooted,” and in the 
relatively unusual circumstance that otherwise admissible 
                                                          
* Professor, UCLA School of Law. Thanks to Richard Friedman, David 
H. Kaye, Kenneth Graham, Lisa Griffin, and Robert Pitler for helpful 
conversations, as well as participants in the conference. Portions of Part II 
previously appeared in DAVID H. KAYE, DAVID E, BERNSTEIN AND JENNIFER 
L. MNOOKIN, THE NEW WIGMORE: EXPERT EVIDENCE (supplement, 2006). 
For helpful research assistance, I thank Hal Melom, Rachel Kleinberg, and 
Michael Madigan. 
1 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
2 U.S. CONST, amend VI. 
3 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
4 Id. at 66. 
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hearsay was not firmly rooted, judges had a great deal of 
discretion with which to determine whether the evidence bore 
the necessary “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”5 
Prior to Crawford, evidence passed Confrontation Clause muster 
so long as it was adequately reliable, and reliability could either 
be “inferred without more” because the evidence fit into a 
longstanding hearsay exception (and hence was firmly rooted), 
or, if it did not, courts could analyze the question of reliability 
directly, and this reliability determination also answered the 
Confrontation Clause inquiry.6 
Crawford dramatically refocused the lens for analyzing 
Confrontation Clause claims. Jettisoning the Ohio v. Roberts 
spotlight on reliability, the opinion substituted an altogether 
different inquiry: was the evidence in question “testimonial”—
meaning, roughly, was it made in circumstances that suggested 
that it was akin to testimony or would be available for use at 
trial?7 If a prior statement is testimonial and the declarant is not 
testifying at trial, the hearsay may be introduced against a 
criminal defendant only if the declarant is unavailable and the 
defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the 
declarant.8 If the prior statement is not testimonial, then the 
Confrontation Clause is not implicated, at least not under the 
Federal Constitution.9 
While the court in Crawford did not precisely delimit the 
boundaries of “testimonial,” it explained in general terms: 
Various formulations of this core class of 
“testimonial” statements exist: “ex parte in-court 
                                                          
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 37, 53-54. 
8 541 U.S. at 53-54. 
9 See Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2274 (2006) (“We must 
decide, therefore, whether the Confrontation Clause applies only to 
testimonial hearsay . . . . The answer to the first question was suggested in 
Crawford, even if not explicitly held: ‘The text of the Confrontation Clause 
reflects this focus [on testimonial hearsay]. . . .’ A limitation so clearly 
reflected in the text of the constitutional provision must fairly be said to mark 
out not merely its ‘core,’ but its perimeter.”) (internal citations omitted). 
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testimony or its functional equivalent—that is, 
material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, 
prior testimony that the defendant was unable to 
cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that 
declarants would reasonably expect to be used 
prosecutorially;” “extrajudicial statements . . . 
contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as 
affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or 
confessions,” “statements that were made under 
circumstances which would lead an objective witness 
reasonably to believe that the statement would be 
available for use at a later trial . . .” These 
formulations all share a common nucleus and then 
define the Clause’s coverage at various levels of 
abstraction around it. Regardless of the precise 
articulation, some statements qualify under any 
definition—for example, ex parte testimony at a 
preliminary hearing.10 
                                                          
10 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52 (internal citations omitted). Scholars and 
courts quickly began to try to define the outer boundaries of the testimonial. 
For early efforts, see, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Grappling with the 
Meaning of “Testimonial”, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 241 (2005); Richard D. 
Friedman, The Confrontation Clause Re-Rooted and Transformed, 2004 
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 439; Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington: 
Encouraging and Ensuring the Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 U. RICH. L. 
REV. 511 (2005). This past term, Davis v. Washington offered additional 
thoughts on how to identify testimonial hearsay, at least in the context of 
statements made in response to interrogation by law enforcement personnel: 
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police 
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the 
primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police 
assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial 
when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such 
ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the 
interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially 
relevant to later criminal prosecution. 
Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2273-74. While Davis explicitly stated that “testimonial” 
statements could extend beyond police interrogations, it did not provide any 
direct guidance for use  in other settings. Id. at 2274 n.1. While Davis does 
not, therefore, speak directly to the question of expert evidence under 
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Whatever the precise definition, the core idea of 
“testimonial” relates to the expected purpose of the statement at 
the time of its utterance. Was the statement made in 
circumstances that suggest its likely future relevance as 
testimony in a criminal prosecution? Often, a statement’s path 
from utterance to legal evidence is serendipitous and 
unexpected—imagine, for example, that someone reports on her 
ate of mind to a friend, and that information later turns out, 
surprisingly to both the original speaker and hearer, to be 
relevant in a legal case; or suppose that a company, which keeps 
its accounts as a matter of course, later finds its business 
relevant to a lawsuit. In these circumstances, such statements are 
clearly not testimonial as the Court understands the term. By 
contrast, if the circumstances in which a given statement was 
made suggest that this information is likely to be useful as legal 
evidence—if, indeed, to quote Davis v. Washington, the 
Supreme Court’s 2006 decision further explicating Crawford in 
the context of police interrogations and statements made to 911, 
the statement’s “primary purpose” is to generate a statement that 
may have later legal relevance, then the statement is clearly 
testimonial.11 
Obviously, this look to “primary purpose” does not resolve 
the question of the boundary of the testimonial; some materials, 
such as affidavits, depositions, and formal confessions, clearly 
fall inside its perimeter, while others, such as many business 
records or most statements made for the purpose of medical 
diagnosis will not. Still other statements will fall neither 
squarely inside nor outside, and their placement will depend on 
how the definition of the testimonial is further honed over time, 
as well as assumptions and factual determinations about the 
particular statement and its purposes. 
Whatever the precise definition of “testimonial,” Crawford 
                                                          
Crawford, its turn to a “primary purpose” test may influence how courts 
assess whether laboratory reports and matters upon which experts rely are 
testimonial. 
11 Id. at 2273-74. Davis limits its attention to statements made in the 
course of police interrogation, but it would not be surprising if this “primary 
purpose” test were to be extended beyond this application. 
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has, without doubt, given additional backbone to the previously 
rather spineless operation of the Confrontation Clause. But like 
all significant constitutional reinterpretations, it has also raised 
as many questions as it has answered, and almost immediately 
after the opinion was issued, both courts and legal academics 
began wrestling with its implications. Defining the limits of 
“testimonial” was obviously an important question: figuring out 
which statements fall within the box labeled “testimonial” and 
which lie safely outside. Myriad other questions arose as well. 
Did the Confrontation Clause prohibit only evidence that fit into 
the category of “testimonial,” or was there some residual role 
for the earlier approaches with respect to non-testimonial 
hearsay? Should the expectation of likely future legal use be 
assessed objectively or subjectively, and should it be analyzed 
from the vantage point of the declarant, the listener, or both?12 
How would Crawford affect particular domains of criminal law, 
such as, for example, domestic violence prosecutions, in which 
the growing trend towards “evidence-based prosecutions” meant 
that typically the prosecution went forward even if the victim 
recanted or refused to testify? Was Scalia’s originalist account of 
the Confrontation Clause’s history plausible or persuasive? 
Courts pondered, academics ruminated, symposia (like this one) 
sprouted. 
This article focuses on one domain within the post-Crawford 
universe that has received rather little academic scrutiny:13 the 
                                                          
12 In Davis, the Court makes clear that the inquiry into whether a 
statement is testimonial should be made based on an objective assessment of 
the circumstances rather than the subjective intent of the declarant. 126 S. Ct. 
at 2273. Davis also states that the focus on testimonial statements reflects 
“not merely its ‘core’ but [the] perimeter” of the Confrontation Clause; non-
testimonial hearsay therefore does not raise Confrontation problems under the 
Federal Constitution. Id. at 2274. 
13 Pamela R. Metzger’s recent article is a notable exception, in the 
context of certificates of analysis. See Pamela R. Metzger, Cheating the 
Constitution, 59 VAND. L. REV. 475 (2006). See also Bradley Morin, Note, 
Science, Crawford and Testimonial Hearsay: Applying the Confrontation 
Clause to Laboratory Reports, 85 B.U.L. REV. 1243 (2005); John M. Spires, 
Note, Testimonial or Nontestimonial The Admissibility of Forensic Evidence 
After Crawford v. Washington, 94 KY. L. J. 187 (2005). 
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intersection of expert evidence with the Confrontation Clause. 
Crawford was celebrated by some as bringing clarity and 
intellectual coherence to an area that had become riddled by both 
inconsistency and intellectually unjustifiable legal fictions.14 
However, a close look at the area of intersection between expert 
testimony and the Confrontation Clause suggests that such 
sanguine predictions may have been premature. As I shall show, 
the area of expert/Crawford intersection has become a serious 
practical concern: a great many lower court opinions have 
wrestled with the potential Confrontation Clause implications of 
expert evidence that includes statements that might be classified 
as testimonial. Most of these courts have endeavored to find 
ways around Crawford’s dictates; unfortunately, most of the 
arguments proffered by these courts are deeply intellectually 
unsatisfying. 
Part I of this Article will briefly describe the ways in which 
expert evidence issues and the Confrontation Clause tend to 
intersect. Part II will describe and critique several arguments 
that lower courts have been making in an effort to avoid 
restricting these forms of evidence under Crawford. In this 
section, my purpose is not to assess the inherent intellectual 
legitimacy of Crawford’s approach. Rather, taking Crawford 
itself as a given, I wish to examine whether and to what extent 
the various approaches taken by lower courts to the problems 
related to expert evidence are intellectually justifiable. 
Unfortunately, as we shall see, these dominant approaches are, 
for the most part, not grounded in a legitimate reading of 
Crawford. Finally, Part III will offer some preliminary 
suggestions toward intellectually more viable approaches for 
evaluating expert evidence under the Confrontation Clause post-
Crawford, attempting to balance Crawford’s goals and purposes 
against the genuine need for the continued availability of 
forensic evidence. 
                                                          
14 See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal 
Procedure: The Triumph of Justice Scalia, the Unlikely Friend of Criminal 
Defendants?, 94 GEO. L. J. 183, 192 (2005) (noting that “The previous case 
law had been a mess,” and that “Crawford at least provides a principle and a 
coherent inquiry for adjudicating Confrontation Clause disputes.”). 
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I.  THE INTERSECTION OF CONFRONTATION CLAUSE CONCERNS 
AND EXPERT EVIDENCE 
When does the Confrontation Clause intersect with issues 
concerning the admissibility and use of expert evidence? There 
are two recurring scenarios in which expert evidence may raise 
Crawford issues. First, expert evidence is sometimes introduced 
without any live testimony at all, through the use of a certificate 
of analysis or some other statutorily-approved method for 
introducing expert evidence via affidavit. Second, testifying 
experts often wish to disclose information upon which they have 
relied in order to form their conclusions, and sometimes, 
especially in the forensic science setting, this disclosed evidence 
may itself constitute testimonial hearsay. This second category 
can be further subdivided into two subcategories: first, when 
experts reveal tests performed or information provided by other 
experts; and second, when experts rely upon information 
provided to them by non-experts in circumstances that make the 
underlying statements at least arguably testimonial. Each of 
these scenarios will be unpacked below in somewhat more 
detail. 
A.  Expert Testimony Without A Witness 
In many—indeed, most—jurisdictions, statutes explicitly 
permit the introduction of some kinds of routinely generated 
expert evidence by forensic scientists without any testimony at 
all.15 For example, a prosecutor might be permitted to offer a 
certificate of analysis written by a forensic scientist describing 
the evidence that was tested, the analyses that were done, and 
the conclusions reached. These statutes hand to prosecutors the 
option of proving key forensic facts by document in lieu of live 
testimony. Some states permit certificates of analysis only in 
                                                          
15 For a useful description of the widespread use of certificates of 
analysis and the constitutional problems they generate, see Metzger, supra 
note 13. According to Metzger, all but six jurisdictions in the United States 
have some kind of statute permitting certificates of analysis in at least some 
circumstances. Id. at 478. 
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particular instances, such as to prove the results of a blood or 
breath alcohol tests, or to establish that the breath detection 
machine used was properly calibrated, or to disclose the 
chemical composition of possible narcotics, but other states 
permit the use of such certificates for any tests conducted by 
forensic scientists.16 
Practically speaking, these statutes mean that the fact that a 
substance found on the defendant’s person was tested and 
determined to be cocaine of a specified quantity might, at the 
prosecutor’s prerogative, be proven by waving an official-
looking paper that says so before the jury, rather than presenting 
live testimony subject to cross examination. In those states that 
permit very broad use of certificates of analysis, written 
evidence without live testimony might even be used to establish 
matters such as the conclusion that the casings found at the 
crime scene match the gun found in the defendant’s nightstand, 
or the determination that the defendant’s fingerprint or DNA 
matched the evidence located at the scene. When a certificate of 
analysis is used, the written statement may wholly substitute for 
putting a witness on the stand. 
Nearly half of those states that permit certificates of analysis 
require the prosecutors to provide the defense with advance 
notice of an intent to use a certificate of analysis, and many (but 
by no means all of these states) do have opt-out provisions that 
allow the defendant to insist that the state offer live testimony in 
lieu of the certificate. However, some of these opt-out 
provisions are quite narrowly drawn, often requiring the defense 
to do something more than simply make the demand for the 
opportunity for confrontation. Take, for example, Alabama’s 
statute, which requires defense counsel not only to certify a 
                                                          
16 While many states restrict the use of certificates of analysis to 
particular circumstances, typically the identification of a controlled substance 
or matters relating to DUI, such as breath alcohol test results and calibration 
records, several state statutes permit essentially all laboratory reports or 
forensic science findings to be admitted via certificate. For examples of the 
latter, see, e.g., Ala. Code §12-21-300 (2006); Ark. Code Ann. §12-12-313 
(2006); Iowa Code. §691.2 (2006); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. Art. 38.41 
(Vernon 2006); Va. Code Ann. §19.2-187 (2006). 
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good-faith intent to cross-examine the witness at trial, but also to 
alert the court to the “basis upon which the requesting party 
intends to challenge the findings.”17 
The Confrontation Clause issues potentially raised by the use 
of certificates of analysis are obvious.18 If these certificates are 
testimonial, then the use of paper evidence instead of live 
testimony by witnesses violates the Confrontation Clause unless 
the declarant is unavailable and the defense had a prior 
opportunity for cross-examination. Apart from retrials after a 
successful appeal or a hung jury, it is unlikely that the defendant 
would have had such an opportunity. So in the vast bulk of 
cases, the only way that these statutes can pass constitutional 
muster post-Crawford is if either (1) the evidence is not 
considered to be testimonial; or (2) if, in the minority of states 
that require advance notice to the defendant and permit some 
kind of opt-out procedure, the defendant’s failure to invoke the 
available pre-trial mechanisms to challenge the prosecution’s use 
of a certificate is understood as a legitimate waiver of her 
Confrontation Clause rights.19 
                                                          
17 Ala. Code. §12-21-302. 
18 For an important early article on the Confrontation Clause issues 
relating to the use of such certificates, see Paul C. Giannelli, Expert 
Testimony and the Confrontation Clause, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 45, 84 (1993). 
For the most detailed post-Crawford analysis, see Metzger, supra note 13. 
19 There are several courts that have held that such opt-out procedures 
make the use of certificates of analysis permissible under Crawford. See, 
e.g., City of Las Vegas v. Walsh, 124 P.3d 203 (Nev. 2005). The opt-out 
provision at issue in Walsh required the defendant to establish to the court’s 
satisfaction that “(a) There is a substantial and bona fide dispute regarding 
the facts in the affidavit or declaration; and (b) It is in the best interests of 
justice that the witness who signed the affidavit or declaration be cross-
examined.” This, to my mind, is deeply problematic: exercising the 
Confrontation right should not require as a prerequisite that the defendant 
persuade the Court that she has a sufficiently valuable reason for doing so. 
Though careful discussion of this point is beyond the scope of this Article, 
assuming (as I argue), that the content of a certificate of analysis is properly 
understood as testimonial and hence is within Crawford’s purview, surely the 
statutes that require either a good faith basis for cross-examination or even a 
good faith intent to cross-examine ought to be seen as constitutionally 
problematic. Some courts have made the still more disturbing argument that 
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Certainly, a straightforward analysis of these certificates 
would suggest that they are testimonial. After all, their central 
purpose is precisely to substitute for live testimony at trial. That 
is, in fact, their very raison d’etre: the whole idea of the 
certificates is to be used in lieu of the testimony that would 
otherwise be necessary. Even if “testimonial” evidence were 
defined as narrowly as possible, it is difficult to see how 
certificates of analysis could fall outside the definition. They are 
indeed a kind of “ex parte in court testimony,” a form of 
“formalized testimonial materials,” in essence, a form of 
affidavit.20 It is almost unimaginable that a principled way could 
be found to distinguish them as a category from other kinds of 
clearly testimonial statements. 
Nonetheless, as Part II will illustrate, many courts are 
rejecting this straightforward analysis and attempting to find 
some way to preserve the use of these certificates 
notwithstanding Crawford. While these arguments will be 
detailed in the following Part, it is worth noting at the outset 
that if Crawford were interpreted to bar the use of certificates of 
analysis, it would be an inconvenience for prosecutors, 
certainly, but it would be unlikely to create insurmountable 
obstacles to the introduction of the underlying evidence. 
                                                          
because the defendant could subpoena the author of the laboratory report at 
no cost if she chose to, the state may use a certificate in lieu of calling a 
witness to the stand. See, e.g., State v. Campbell, 719 N.W.2d 374 (N.D. 
2006). This form of burden-shifting offers an extremely weak form of 
protection of the Confrontation right, and is difficult to reconcile with 
Crawford’s emphasis. 
 However, this does not mean that all forms of routine waivers ought to 
be prohibited. While it is true that even a statute that requires a defendant to 
object to the prosecution’s planned use of a certificate is not cost-free for a 
defendant, a simple demand requirement, in which the defendant need not 
give a reason, persuade the court, or have a lawyer affirm any actual intent 
to cross-examine, might offer a reasonable way to balance efficiency 
concerns against the protection of the defendant’s opportunity to cross-
examine. Careful consideration of the legitimacy of waiver options is, 
however, beyond the scope of this Article. In Part II, I focus instead on the 
question of whether certificates of analysis are properly understood as 
testimonial. 
20 See the variety of definitions on offer in Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52. 
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Certificates of analysis are, in essence, a shortcut to the process 
of proof, so prohibiting them would force the prosecutor to take 
the long way around. But it would not do more than that. 
Removing a shortcut would increase costs and this in turn might 
to some extent affect the balance of power between defendant 
and prosecutor, which might in turn have some affect on each 
party’s willingness to negotiate or the precise terms of plea 
bargains. Eliminating or curtailing the use of certificates of 
analysis would obviously increase the costs of prosecution to 
some extent; that, of course, is generally true of any increase in 
constitutional protection afforded to defendants. But abolishing 
or restricting them would be unlikely to cause massive logistical 
or practical problems. Strong evidence on this point is provided 
by a simple fact: at present, several states (including the most 
populous state, California) do not permit the use of certificates 
of analysis at all, and yet the criminal trial process in these 
jurisdictions does somehow manage to function. In addition, 
even if certificates of analysis are properly understood to be 
testimonial, it might be possible to develop constitutionally 
permissible waiver procedures under which their use would be 
allowed unless the defendant opted out of permitting the state to 
use them. 
B.  Expert Basis Evidence 
Rule 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence permits experts to 
rely upon inadmissible evidence “if of a type reasonably relied 
upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or 
inferences upon the subject,” and most states have similar 
provisions.21 This Rule means that the information that helps 
shape or form the expert opinion does not itself need to be 
admissible in evidence, so long as it is the kind of information 
that experts in the field would typically use for reaching 
conclusions or opinions like this one. The logic justifying the 
rule is essentially a form of deference to legitimate expertise: if 
the expert herself can assess whether a particular piece of 
                                                          
21 FED. R. EVID. 703. 
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information is worth being considered as part of the basis for 
her conclusion, why should the court second-guess this judgment 
by the expert, especially if it is a judgment that conforms with 
the customary norms of the expert’s community?22 
A related but distinct question is whether an expert may 
disclose the information upon which she has relied to form her 
opinion to the jury, even if that information is itself otherwise 
inadmissible. The strongest argument in favor of disclosure is to 
create the possibility for educating the jury by making the 
expert’s conclusion and reasoning more transparent. If the jury 
does not know the underlying facts or bases for an expert’s 
conclusions, it is difficult to see how the jury could rationally 
assess the plausibility of the expert’s judgment. Without such 
disclosure, the jury may have little choice but to defer (or not) 
to an expert’s credentials, and to assess her demeanor rather 
than unpack her arguments. Without disclosure, the jury may 
lack the fundamental building blocks that could permit it to 
evaluate the substantive merits of the expert’s conclusion.23 If 
we want to encourage, or indeed even permit, rational 
evaluation of an expert’s conclusions by the jury, permitting the 
disclosure of basis evidence would appear to be a very good 
idea. 
However, this strong argument in favor of permitting 
disclosure is matched by an equally strong argument against it: 
if disclosure is permitted, it is likely to become a mechanism by 
which savvy lawyers funnel otherwise inadmissible hearsay 
evidence to the jury. Permitting disclosure of all matters upon 
which an expert has reasonably relied would risk opening the 
door to a great deal of hearsay evidence, and could turn the 
expert into a conduit for large quantities of otherwise 
inadmissible, and potentially prejudicial, information. At an 
extreme, parties might even introduce an expert precisely for the 
purpose of getting before the jury evidence that would otherwise 
                                                          
22 See generally Advisory Committee Note, FED. R. EVID. 703. 
23 See generally Ronald J. Allen & Joseph S. Miller, The Common Law 
Theory of Experts: Deference or Education, 87 NW. L. REV. 1131 (1993). 
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be prohibited.24 
In short, so long as experts may rely on inadmissible factual 
matters as the bases for their conclusion, there is an inevitable 
tension between jury education and adherence to the rest of the 
rules of evidence.25 In practice, the dominant approach has been 
to permit disclosure of an expert’s basis evidence subject to a 
balancing test.26 Prior to the year 2000, many courts applied that 
Rule 403 balancing test so familiar to every student of evidence, 
and looked to whether the probative value of disclosure was 
“substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
                                                          
24 There has been significant scholarly discussion of this issue. See, e.g., 
Ronald L. Carlson, Collision Course in Expert Testimony: Limitations on 
Affirmative Introduction of Underlying Data, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 234 (1984); 
Ronald L. Carlson, Experts as Hearsay Conduits: Confrontation Abuses in 
Opinion Testimony, 76 MINN. L. REV. 859 (1992); Ronald L. Carlson, 
Experts, Judges and Commentators, The Underlying Debate About an 
Expert’s Underlying Data, 4 MERCER L. REV. 481 (1996); Ronald L. 
Carlson, Is Revised Expert Witness Rule 703 a Critical Modernization for the 
New Century, 52 FLA. L. REV. 715 (2000); Ronald L. Carlson, Policing the 
Bases of Modern Expert Testimony, 39 VAND. L. REV. 577 (1986); Joanne 
A. Epps, Clarifying the Meaning of Federal Rule of Evidence 703, 36 B.C. 
L. REV. 53 (1994); David L. Faigman, Struggling to Stop the Flood of 
Unreliable Expert Testimony, 76 MINN. L. REV. 877 (1992); Edward J. 
Imwinkelried, Developing a Coherent Theory of the Structure of Federal Rule 
of Evidence 703, 47 MERCER L. REV. 447 (1996); L. Timothy Perrin, Expert 
Witnesses Under Rule 703 and 803 (4) of the Federal Rules of Evidence: 
Separating the Wheat from the Chaff, 72 IND. L. J. 939 (1997); Peter J. 
Rescorl, Fed. R. Evid. 703, A Back Door Entrance for Hearsay and Other 
Inadmissible Evidence: A Time for Change, 63 TEMP L. REV. 543 (1990); 
Paul R. Rice, Inadmissible Evidence as a Basis for Expert Testimony: A 
Reply to Professor Carlson, 40 VAND. L. REV. 483 (1987); Paul R. Rice, 
The Allure of the Illogic: A Coherent Solution for Rule 703 Requires More 
than Redefining “Facts or Data”, 47 MERCER L. REV. 495 (1996); Charles J. 
Walsh & Beth S. Rose, Increasing the Useful Information Provided by 
Experts in the Courtroom: A Comparison of Federal Rules of Evidence 703 
and 803(18) in Illinois, Ohio, and New York, 26 SETON HALL. L. REV. 183 
(1995). 
25 For further discussion of this issue, see DAVID KAYE, DAVID 
BERNSTEIN, AND JENNIFER MNOOKIN, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON 
EVIDENCE: EXPERT EVIDENCE §3.7 (2004). 
26 See generally id. 
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confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.”27 In 2000, 
Federal Rule of Evidence 705 was amended to address 
concretely the issue of disclosure, and reversed the Rule 403 
balancing test, making non-disclosure the default, unless the 
probative value of disclosure substantially outweighs the harm of 
non-disclosure.28 A few states have followed the federal rule, 
but most have not amended their equivalent state rule, and at 
present disclosure practices vary significantly across 
jurisdictions.29 Notwithstanding Rule 705 and the existence of 
rules of some kind on this point in many states, on-the-ground 
practices with respect to the extent of expert disclosures vary 
tremendously, even within jurisdictions, and are typically not 
very closely regulated by appellate courts. 
As the cases concerning Crawford and expert evidence 
themselves reveal, however, there is no doubt that a great deal 
of expert basis evidence is regularly being disclosed to juries—
and it is this disclosure that potentially raises the Confrontation 
Clause concern. When an expert details the statements made by 
an out-of-court declarant, the defendant does not have the 
chance to cross-examine the witness whose statements are 
relayed to the jury. To be sure, it is frequently the case that the 
hearsay basis for an expert’s testimony will not be testimonial 
under any reasonable definition of the term. When a doctor 
relies on other medical records made in the course of treatment, 
or an appraiser relies on comparable prior sales, or an expert in 
                                                          
27 FED. R. EVID. 403. For cases articulating this standard, see, e.g., 
Guillory v. Dontar Indus. 95 F. 3d 1320, 1331 (5th Cir. 1996); Gong v. 
Hirsch, 913 F. 2d 1269, 1273 (7th Cir. 1990). 
28 Federal Rule of Evidence 705 now reads, “Facts or data that are 
otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the proponent of 
the opinion or inference unless the courts determine that their probative value 
in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert’s opinion substantially outweighs 
their prejudicial effect.” A few states have followed suit, but many have left 
their equivalent rules unchanged. See Kaye et al, supra note 23 at §3.8.2. 
29 To give an example, Pennsylvania and Rhode Island make disclosure 
of the basis of an expert opinion both admissible and mandatory, whereas 
Minnesota restricts disclosure to civil cases and even then only permits it 
when “the underlying data is particularly trustworthy.” See Pa. R. Evid., 
704; R.E. R. Evid. 703; and Minn. R. Evid. 703. 
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gang structure relies on interviews conducted with former gang 
members over many years and not related to the particular case, 
no plausible understanding of “testimonial” would encompass 
these statements. They were not made in circumstances that 
would suggest that they were going to be used in a trial as a 
substitute for live testimony, nor were they spoken with the 
expectation that they would be used to prove some fact in court. 
However, in other circumstances, a portion of an expert’s 
basis may well fit within the category of “testimonial.” While 
the variety of potential circumstances is great, two recurring 
categories of evidence that are implicated by Crawford are 
described briefly below: a testifying expert’s description of the 
findings of other forensic experts; and an expert’s disclosure of 
statements learned during the process of investigating the case. 
Note that there may be a Crawford problem even when there 
is no problem with disclosure under Rules 703 and 705. In some 
cases, the matters upon which experts rely may be hearsay that 
is admissible under some other exception. Prior to Crawford, 
disclosure of this evidence would not have been problematic 
(unless the hearsay exception that applied was not firmly rooted, 
in which case a reliability analysis would have been necessary if 
the evidence was understood to have been introduced 
substantively for the truth of its contents). But Crawford changes 
this analysis: even if the basis evidence fits into some legitimate 
hearsay exception, while it does not fall into Rule 705’s 
limitations on disclosure (or any state equivalent), if the 
underlying evidence is testimonial, it may still be barred by 
Crawford. Moreover, even in those states that have heretofore 
permitted or even required disclosure of an expert’s basis on 
direct testimony, if the disclosure is testimonial, the 
Confrontation Clause must obviously trump. 
1.  Experts Reporting the Case-Specific Findings of Other 
Experts 
On many occasions, the forensic expert who testifies in court 
is not the person who actually conducted the forensic tests in the 
case. One person might carry out a toxicological analysis, a 
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DNA test, or an autopsy, while an altogether different person 
stands before the jury to provide testimony, often another 
employee in the same laboratory. Sometimes the testifying 
witness is the original analysts’ supervisor or successor, or it 
might just be the staff member who happened to be free to come 
to court that day, or perhaps the person already testifying in 
some other case that day and hence conveniently available to do 
double duty; or possibly it is whichever laboratory analyst is 
thought to be best at testifying before the jury. Typically, this 
testifying witness’s conclusions derive primarily from looking 
over the laboratory results of the non-testifying expert. In such a 
circumstance, courts often permit the testifying witness to 
describe in detail the tests conducted by others, and frequently 
also permit the actual test reports themselves to be formally 
introduced into evidence and presented to the jury. 
The potential Crawford issues are clear. If an expert testifies 
about tests she has personally conducted, there is obviously no 
Confrontation Clause problem: the expert is on the stand and 
available for cross-examination. But when an expert reports to 
the jury detail and substance of tests conducted by others, is she 
relaying constitutionally prohibited testimonial hearsay? In order 
to permit such testimony, a court would need to be able 
legitimately to claim that the evidence was either not hearsay or 
not testimonial. Otherwise, Crawford would bar such 
disclosures, unless either the expert who actually conducted the 
tests was also testifying, or the original expert was unavailable 
and the defendant had been afforded a prior opportunity to 
cross-examine. 
As with certificates of analysis, a straight-faced reading of 
Crawford seems to make it difficult to avoid the conclusion that 
at least some of this expert basis evidence is testimonial. In the 
next Part, I will explore in some detail why it is not plausible to 
conclude that expert basis evidence of this sort is not hearsay.30 
And certainly these reports are produced in clear contemplation 
of future legal proceedings. Unlike certificates of analysis, 
which are truly intended to substitute for testimony, with 
                                                          
30 See generally Part II. 
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forensic science reports of these kinds it is frequently 
contemplated that someone’s testimony will accompany the 
report.31 But if it is not the declarant herself who testifies, then 
the report is certainly operating as “ex parte in court 
testimony.” 
It is worth noting that, were Crawford construed to apply to 
these situations, most of the time it would be a logistical 
inconvenience for the prosecution but not an insurmountable 
problem. Much of the time, it would be feasible to introduce 
forensic science testimony through the particular forensic 
scientist who conducted the test. It might put pressure on 
laboratories to hire only those forensic scientists who had 
appealing courtroom demeanors, and it might frequently be 
inconvenient—imagine for example a number of small-scale drug 
trials happening the same day, for which it would be far easier 
to send one person to court rather than the four different people 
who had conducted the actual tests at issue. 
Sometimes, however, compliance would be more than an 
inconvenience. When the original author of the report was 
genuinely unavailable, Crawford’s dictates could pose a serious 
problem of proof. Any time a forensic scientist quit her job, 
moved to another state, or died, there would be a backlog of 
cases for which she had done the tests but that had not yet gone 
to trial—how would these tests now be introduced into evidence? 
Particularly in those areas where there is frequently a long lag 
time between forensic examination and prosecution—take murder 
cases, for example, in which many years might regularly 
separate the autopsy and arrest, much less the trial itself—
Crawford’s requirements could create severe difficulties if no 
work-around was available. 
                                                          
31 Note, however, that in some jurisdictions, forensic science reports are 
regularly introduced without accompanying testimony, accompanied by some 
certification, the details of which depend on the state. See Metzger, supra 
note 13 at 486-88 and accompanying notes. 
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2.  Expert Disclosures of Non-Expert Basis Evidence 
Crawford concerns can also arise in those cases in which 
experts testifying on behalf of the prosecution have interviewed 
subjects in the course of gathering information and preparing 
their testimony for the particular case. Imagine, for example, 
that a forensic psychologist interviews friends and relatives of 
the defendant about her behavior around the time of the crime in 
order to assist in her assessment of the defendant’s sanity. Or, in 
a criminal case arising from a vehicular accident, an accident 
reconstruction expert might base his opinion partly on affidavits 
made by witnesses to the authorities, or might go out herself to 
conduct interviews with onlookers. A gang expert might 
examine statements made by suspects under interrogation, or 
might conduct interviews with former gang members to learn 
more about operational details of the gang to which the 
defendant is thought to belong. 
Myriad additional examples could be generated; the point is 
that when an expert retained by the prosecution gathers 
statements from people who know that she is an expert retained 
by the prosecution, or uses statements gathered by the police, 
these statements may quite possibly fall within the boundaries of 
the testimonial. If so, then any expert disclosure of the substance 
of these statements might also run afoul of Crawford. Note, 
however, that whether basis evidence of this sort is testimonial 
is a closer question than the earlier two categories, because it is 
typically less formalized, and depending on the circumstances, it 
might, from the declarant’s perspective, not be as obviously 
made in anticipation of litigation or understood to be a potential 
substitute for testimony. If, as the definition of testimonial is 
further honed, the “formalized” nature of the statements is 
thought to be central, then some utterances of these sorts might 
be outside the definition’s boundaries. By contrast, if the key 
question is whether either a reasonable listener or declarant 
would have expected the information to be used prosecutorially, 
then these kinds of expert basis evidence would often be 
testimonial. 
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How much of a practical impediment would it be to bar 
these kinds of disclosure by experts? In some circumstances, the 
underlying evidence upon which the expert relies might be 
independently admissible. Obviously if the same individuals 
upon whom the expert relies are also testifying and hence 
available for cross-examination, this cures any potential 
Crawford problem. In other instances, experts might be 
permitted to rely upon such evidence but not disclose it—an 
expert might explain to the jury that her conclusions about the 
gang structure were based in part on transcripts of an 
interrogation by the police with other gang members, without 
describing the details of what these interrogations revealed. 
This, to be sure, gives the jury less information with which to 
substantively evaluate the expert’s conclusion; it pushes the jury 
further toward the deference pole of the deference/education 
axis. It also raises the intriguing question of whether the logic of 
Crawford places any limitations on the reliance upon testimonial 
evidence, or simply limits its in-court disclosure, but serious 
discussion of this question is beyond the scope of this Article. 
II.  AVOIDING REALITY: COURTS’ EFFORTS TO CATEGORIZE 
EXPERT BASIS EVIDENCE AND CERTIFICATES OF ANALYSIS AS 
NON-TESTIMONIAL 
Prior to Crawford, most cases downplayed any Confrontation 
Clause concerns wrought by expert reliance upon or disclosure 
of hearsay, or by the use of certificates of analysis.32 Some of 
the arguments typically proffered by courts included the 
following: (1) when the evidence is admitted for the limited 
purpose of helping the jury evaluate the expert’s basis, it is not 
offered for the truth of its contents and hence, because it is not 
hearsay, the Confrontation Clause is not implicated; (2) 
frequently, the facts disclosed by the expert are such that the 
                                                          
32 A few courts did find such testimony to violate the Sixth Amendment. 
See, e.g., State v. Towne, 453 A.2d 1133 (Vt. 1982) (finding that expert’s 
testimony that another non-testifying doctor agreed with him, coupled with 
prosecutor’s emphasis of this point, amounted to a violation of defendant’s 
confrontation rights). 
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assistance to the defendant from confrontation would have been 
limited; (3) the availability of a testifying expert for cross-
examination is an adequate substitute for cross-examining the 
hearsay declarant; and (4) because the basis for allowing the 
expert’s reliance under Rule 703 is reliability, the disclosed 
information should also be deemed reliable enough to eliminate 
Confrontation Clause concerns.33 Some courts even tried to 
argue that that reliance on factual matters by an expert under 
Rule 703 was a firmly rooted hearsay exception.34 Given that 
Rule 703 is not explicitly framed as a hearsay exception at all, 
this argument was especially persuasive.35 
In the two years since Crawford, many state and federal 
courts have confronted cases involving expert reliance upon and 
disclosure of matters that are at least arguably testimonial, as 
well as numerous cases involving the continued use, post-
Crawford, of certificates of analysis. A handful of courts have 
concluded, sometimes reluctantly, that Crawford bars the use or 
disclosure of such evidence. Most of the time, however, courts 
have held that the Confrontation Clause does not bar either 
disclosure by experts or the use of certificates of analysis. 
                                                          
33 See, e.g., Barrett v. Acevedo, 169 F. 3d 1155 (8th Cir. 1999) 
(suggesting that disclosure of basis was for a purpose other than the truth of 
its contents and hence neither hearsay nor a violation of the Confrontation 
Clause); Reardon v. Manson, 806 F. 2d 39 (2d Cir. 1986) (finding sufficient 
indicia of reliability to justify use and disclosure of hearsay by expert and 
emphasizing defendant’s opportunity to cross-examine expert). 
34 See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 299 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2002) 
(finding expert’s reliance on hearsay to be “firmly rooted” for confrontation 
clause purposes); State v. Hutto, 481 S.E.2d 432 (S.C. 1997) (same). 
35 As State v. Rogovich, 932 P.2d 794 (Ariz. 1997), correctly noted, 
“[b]ecause Rule 703 is not a hearsay exception . . . it is certainly not firmly 
rooted.” Id. at 798. Rule 803, the federal rule against hearsay, makes 
hearsay inadmissible “except as provided by these rules or other rules 
prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority.” One could 
argue that Rule 703 and Rule 705, which, prior to their amendment in 2000, 
implicitly permitted disclosure at least some of the time, were “other rules” 
under Rule 803, and thus, they operated as a legitimate hearsay exception.  
This argument is strained but not wholly preposterous; however, even if these 
rules created an implicit hearsay exception, it would be difficult to claim with 
a straight face that it was a firmly-rooted one. 
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Perhaps surprisingly, many courts have continued to make 
precisely the same arguments that they made prior to Crawford.  
A close look at several of the arguments mustered by the 
courts who deem such evidence non-testimonial or otherwise 
find Crawford inapplicable shows them to be generally 
unpersuasive, sometimes even disingenuous. Even if reliance on 
testimonial evidence by experts continues to be permissible 
under Crawford, it is difficult to justify disclosure of this 
testimonial basis to the factfinder. In this section, I will describe 
and evaluate the stratagems by which state and federal courts are 
attempting to limit Crawford’s applicability to forms of expert 
evidence. I will give particular attention to the argument that an 
expert’s factual basis disclosures are not hearsay at all, for this 
claim is an especially tempting, though in my view unjustifiable, 
way for courts to avoid creating a Crawford problem. 
A.  The Evidence is Introduced for a Non-Hearsay Purpose 
Prior to Crawford, many courts permitted experts to describe 
the substance of the sources upon which they relied, arguing that 
not only were there no Confrontation Clause issues at stake in 
such disclosures, but that these disclosures were actually not 
even hearsay at all. This issue commonly arose when courts had 
to decide whether to permit experts to disclose matters upon 
which they relied, but that were not independently admissible 
under some hearsay exception. As I described in Part I, Rule 
703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence explicitly permits experts 
to rely upon inadmissible evidence “if of a type reasonably 
relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions 
or inferences upon the subject,” and most state evidence rules 
contain similar provisions.36 When an expert relies on 
inadmissible evidence that fits the confines of the rule, can she 
tell the jury about the basis for her conclusions? Can she 
disclose this otherwise inadmissible evidence to them? 
Certainly, prior to Crawford and the revisions to Rule 705 
that shifted the balancing testing federal court to favor non-
                                                          
36 FED. R. EVID. 703. 
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disclosure, courts were regularly in the habit of permitting 
experts to disclose the factual foundation for their conclusions. 
When such evidence was admitted, it led to a related question: 
what, precisely, was the evidentiary status of this disclosed 
foundation? Once disclosed, was it formally “in evidence” for 
all purposes, including to prove the truth of its contents? Or, 
was it available only for some more limited purpose, and if so, 
what might this purpose be? One approach taken by courts—and 
which some courts are continuing to employ, even after 
Crawford—was to suggest that the disclosure of the expert’s 
basis was actually permitted not for the truth of its contents, but 
only for a more limited purpose: to help the jury assess the 
expert’s opinions and conclusions. 
Rules of limited admissibility are commonplace in evidence 
law. They inevitably invite questions about whether they actually 
work—whether it is plausible to believe factfinders capable of 
the mental gymnastics necessary to consider a piece of proffered 
information for one purpose while wiping it clear out of their 
minds when ruminating upon some other question for which 
common sense might deem the item of evidence relevant. There 
are many places where the Rules of Evidence ask juries to cut 
distinctions finer than ordinary—or for that matter, perhaps even 
extraordinary—minds are capable: for example, when evidence 
of a testifying defendant’s prior convictions are ostensibly 
admitted to shed light on her credibility, but not her general 
character or her propensity to commit crime.37 In general, courts 
operate as if limited admissibility does work, even in those cases 
when reasonable minds might doubt that it actually can, though 
occasionally the fiction of limited admissibility seems too 
blatantly fictional to tolerate.38 But when it came to figuring out 
how to treat basis evidence disclosed by an expert witness, 
courts had both a doctrinal and practical need to find a way to 
see the evidence as admitted only for a limited purpose, rather 
                                                          
37 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 609. 
38 See, e.g., Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (finding that 
an out-of-court confession by a co-defendant accomplice, implicating the 
defendant, is barred by the Confrontation Clause unless the accomplice 
testifies and is available for cross-examination at trial). 
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than generally admitted for the truth of its contents. 
Why so? First, the practical difficulty: the obvious danger 
with permitting disclosure by experts of their basis evidence is 
that attorneys may attempt to “funnel” otherwise inadmissible 
evidence in through experts; to get before the jury materials that 
otherwise would be excluded. While subjecting disclosure to 
some kind of balancing test might reduce this danger, another 
protection, albeit a small one, might be offered by refusing to 
treat these disclosures as substantive evidence of the truth of 
their contents. This would, for example, prevent an attorney 
from relying on a fact disclosed by an expert but otherwise not 
in evidence in her closing argument. Nor could such a disclosure 
be considered to establish the legal sufficiency of the evidence 
for any element of the crime charged. Although whether these 
limitations offered any substantial protection against expert 
funneling might be doubtful, at least at the margins they 
encouraged parties to introduce what evidence they could 
through other channels rather than simply having the expert 
disclose it as part of her factual basis. 
Moreover, prior to Crawford, this “not for the truth of its 
contents” stratagem offered the added benefit of making the 
Confrontation Clause issue easy. Doctrinally, if expert 
disclosures of basis evidence were treated as substantive 
evidence offered to prove the truth of their contents, then they 
were, functionally, a form of hearsay that fit no articulated 
exception. As a matter of statutory interpretation, clearly this 
would have suggested a lack of artful drafting: if they were an 
admissible form of hearsay, why was there no corresponding 
hearsay exception?39 A more serious problem, however, would 
be that given that there was no explicit hearsay exception, these 
disclosures could not be seen to fit a firmly rooted hearsay 
exception, and thus, in criminal cases when the disclosures were 
                                                          
39 Some have argued that there should be an explicit hearsay exception. 
See, e.g., Paul R. Rice, Inadmissible Evidence as a Basis for Expert 
Testimony: A Reply to Professor Carlson, supra note 24; Paul R. Rice, The 
Allure of the Illogic: A Coherent Solution for Rule 703 Requires More than 
Redefining “Facts or Data”, supra note 24 (suggesting possibility of a new 
hearsay exception for expert basis materials). 
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offered by experts testifying for the prosecution, the 
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence of the time—requiring 
“particularized guarantees of trustworthiness”—would have been 
implicated.40 Making such a determination would have at a 
minimum added a layer of complexity to the decision whether to 
permit disclosure of the basis evidence, and in many cases, it 
might not have been plausible to argue that there were 
particularized guarantees of reliability, as opposed to more 
structural indicators merely suggesting that the category of 
evidence is typically reliable. 
Recall that the very basis for permitting expert reliance on 
inadmissible evidence under Rule 703 is the assumption that 
qualified experts themselves can adequately determine whether 
facts within their purview are worthy of reliance, whether or not 
they conform to the precise dictates of the rules of evidence.41 
Indeed, in many circumstances, it may be every bit as 
reasonable to think that an expert’s basis evidence is as reliable 
as  evidence that fits, for example, the “excited utterance” 
exception or evidence admitted under Rule 803(3) and the 
Hillmon doctrine regarding someone’s future intent (both of 
which courts have deemed “firmly rooted”).42 Recall further that 
prior to Crawford, the protections of the Confrontation Clause 
were not, to say the least, terribly robust. 
Moreover, the jurisprudence that followed Ohio v. Roberts 
was filled with jurisprudential moves that could only be 
understood as legal fictions. For example, the Court declared 
that all firmly rooted hearsay exceptions met the necessary 
reliability standard ipse dixit; that any firmly rooted hearsay 
exception was sufficiently reliable was, in essence, an 
                                                          
40 Occasionally courts did try to suggest that basic evidence disclosed by 
experts fell into a firmly rooted hearsay exception—a rather incredible claim, 
considering the nonexistence of any formal hearsay exception on the matter. 
41 FED. R. EVID. 703. 
42 See, e.g., Hayes v. York, 311 F.3d 321, 324 (4th Cir. 2002) (finding 
North Carolina’s state of mind exception to be firmly rooted for 
Confrontation Clause purposes, relying in part on the long history of the 
Hillmon doctrine). 
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irrebutable presumption, taken as true as a matter of law.43 The 
courts were willing to see nearly all the main hearsay exceptions 
(except for the residual exception44 and the Rule 804 exception 
for statements against interest45) as firmly rooted—and even 
when the specific contours of a hearsay exception were tinkered 
with via judicial opinion or by revision to the Rule, courts still 
found these recently modified versions of the exceptions to 
remain firmly rooted!46 Considering this approach to the 
Confrontation Clause in aggregate, for courts to be forced into a 
detailed Confrontation Clause analysis in order to permit 
disclosure by an expert would have seemed at odds with the 
generally meager protections it appeared to offer criminal 
defendants against hearsay. It would have meant that the 
protection turned out to be especially robust in a place where the 
arguments for it were, if not weakest, then certainly no stronger 
than in many other settings. 
If only there were some way to see disclosures by experts in 
terms that would not implicate the Confrontation Clause, this 
peculiar result could be avoided. The courts invented such a 
method: if the disclosure of basis evidence by experts was not 
hearsay at all, as a corollary, it was by definition outside of the 
Confrontation Clause’s purview. 
This commonly made argument went like this: when experts 
tell the jury about the matters upon which they relied, they are 
not disclosing this information in order for the jury to make a 
decision about its truth. Rather, these disclosures happen for an 
(allegedly) separate purpose: to help the jury evaluate the 
credibility of an expert. The jury will better be able to determine 
if the expert has adequate grounds for her conclusion, and 
whether she warrants being believed, by hearing about the 
                                                          
43 As Ohio v. Roberts put it, it could be “inferred without more.” 
Roberts, 448 U.S., at 66. 
44 See generally Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817 (1990). 
45 Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 133-34 (1999). 
46 See, e.g., Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183 (1987) 
(rejecting the idea that the court’s modification of how co-conspirator 
statements could be established to the judge had any effect on whether the 
exception was firmly rooted). 
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expert’s sources—not only the categories of information upon 
which she relied, but the substance. Therefore, when this 
substance is disclosed, it is introduced for the ostensibly non-
hearsay purpose of aiding the factfinder in her evaluation of the 
expert testimony. Because the information is not being 
introduced for the truth of its contents, it is not actually hearsay 
at all, and any potential Confrontation Clause problem 
disappears into thin air. 
The problem with this argument is that notwithstanding its 
frequent invocation by courts, it makes almost no sense. To be 
sure, the jury might have better grounds for evaluating the 
expert’s testimony if it hears about the data upon which the 
expert relied for her conclusion. But part of a rational evaluation 
of the expert will thus entail an evaluation of her sources—which 
will inevitably involve a judgment about the likelihood that the 
sources themselves are valid and worthy of reliance. In other 
words, to decide how much to credit the expert’s sources, the 
jury should, logically, first assess the odds that they are reliable. 
And what is this but a judgment about the likely truth of their 
contents? Using the information for the permissible purpose of 
evaluating the expert thus necessarily requires a preliminary 
determination about the information’s truth. The permitted 
purpose is therefore neither separate nor separable from an 
evaluation of the truth of the statement’s contents. 
To say that evidence offered for the purpose of helping the 
jury to assess the expert’s basis is not being introduced for the 
truth of its contents rests on an inferential error. To make 
rational use of this evidence, a factfinder must first assess the 
likelihood that it is worth relying upon. Having done so, she 
may then build upon this first inference in order to assess the 
likely reliability of the expert’s conclusions. The second 
inference is what is permitted by the allegedly non-hearsay 
purpose for the evidence. But this second judgment relies upon 
the first, and the first is inherently a judgment about the likely 
truth of the underlying basis. The fact that this underlying 
judgment about the truth is then subsequently used in making 
another judgment does not mean that the evidence is being used 
for a non-hearsay purpose.  
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To see this point more clearly, consider an example from 
outside the expert context. Suppose a witness took the stand and 
testified, “John was extremely drunk the night of April 13th.” 
Imagine that the foundation for this opinion was not that the 
witness had seen John slurring his words or imbibing large 
quantities of alcohol, but rather, that a friend, whom the witness 
had seen that night had reported to him that earlier that evening, 
John had consumed seven drinks in the span of two hours. This 
friend’s statement, if relayed to the court by the witness, would 
obviously be hearsay. The fact that it informed the witness’ 
judgment about John’s drunkenness would not somehow make it 
non-hearsay, or suggest that it was being introduced for a 
purpose other than the truth of its contents, assuming that the 
purpose of the witness’ testimony was to assert the conclusion 
that John was drunk.47 As a logical matter, the jury can only 
believe the witness’ conclusion about John’s drunkenness if it 
also credits what the witness’ friend told him. This is quite 
clearly a judgment about the truth of the matter asserted. By 
contrast, if the witness had behaved in a particular way toward 
John that evening because he believed him to be drunk, and that 
behavior by the witness was itself relevant to the case, then the 
statement could be introduced for the non-hearsay purpose of the 
effect on the listener—it would be introduced not to establish 
that John was drunk, but rather to inform our understanding of 
why the witness behaved as he did. The mere fact that the friend 
had said this to the witness would then be relevant for 
understanding the witness’s actions—whether or not the words 
spoken by the friend were accurate or true. But there is no 
parallel to this “effect on listener” argument that holds up in the 
context of expert basis evidence. The basis evidence is not being 
introduced to explain the expert’s actions, but rather to explain 
her conclusions. And assessing the conclusions is a judgment 
about reliability, a determination about truth. 
When Confrontation Clause jurisprudence was rather 
                                                          
47 Of course, if this was the witness’ sole basis for his opinion of 
drunkenness, the opposing party could also object for lack of personal 
knowledge. In the expert context, there is no requirement under the federal 
rules of personal knowledge of underlying facts. 
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toothless, this claim that expert basis evidence was being 
introduced for a purpose apart from the truth of its contents 
could have been seen as fictional but harmless, just another 
fiction of a piece with the rest of the striking fictions that 
operated within the doctrine.48 Given how little hearsay was 
thought to be problematic under Ohio v. Roberts, an approach 
that resulted in treating expert disclosures on par with most 
other forms of hearsay, was, at least arguably, a practical 
compromise even if it strained logic and common sense.49 
Under Crawford, however, a reliability determination is 
neither a necessary nor even a permissible inquiry for 
determining whether evidence meets the Confrontation Clause. 
Therefore, whatever confidence a court might have about the 
likely reliability of an expert’s basis evidence is, quite simply, 
beside the point. Moreover, the stakes in making the 
hearsay/non-hearsay determination have increased. Prior to 
Crawford, if a court deemed an expert’s disclosure or basis 
evidence to be hearsay, that would have triggered analysis under 
both the hearsay rule and under the Confrontation Clause. 
Frequently, the disclosed evidence would have met the 
requirements of one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule—for 
example, forensic science reports could be deemed business 
records (so long as the court did not think that the fact that they 
were produced by litigation did not prevent them from falling 
within the exception's confines); statements made to the police 
by excited onlookers to an accident, and later used by an 
accident reconstructionist, might well be excited utterances; 
statements made by family members to a psychiatrist might fall 
into the exception for statements made for purposes of medical 
diagnoses or treatment. These are, of course, just examples—the 
point is that whenever the basis evidence fit into a firmly rooted 
hearsay exception, admitting the evidence as permitted hearsay 
posed no Confrontation Clause issue. Moreover, under the Rule 
                                                          
48 Certainly some scholars did not see it as harmless. See, for example, 
the several articles by Ronald Carlson, supra note 24. 
49 To be sure, some judges resisted treating expert disclosures in this 
manner even before Crawford. See, e.g., the strongly worded dissent in 
United States v. Corey, 207 F.3d 84, 105 (1st Cir. 2000). 
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803 exceptions, whether or not the hearsay declarant would have 
been available to testify was irrelevant.50 
Often, then, permitting the evidence in under Rule 703 was 
simply a useful shortcut for evidence that could have been 
admitted in other ways. Indeed, the Advisory Committee Note to 
Rule 703 explicitly explains Rule 703 in these terms: 
Thus a physician in his own practice bases his 
diagnoses on information from numerous sources and 
of considerable variety, including statements by 
patients and relatives, reports and opinions from 
nurses, technicians and other doctors, hospital records 
and X rays. Most of them are admissible in evidence, 
but only with the expenditures of substantial time in 
producing and examining various authenticating 
witnesses. The physician makes life-and-death 
decisions in reliance upon them. His validation, 
expertly performed and subject to cross-examination, 
ought to suffice for judicial purposes.51 
Whenever evidence could have been introduced under a 
firmly-rooted hearsay exception, admitting it instead under Rule 
703 to explain the expert’s conclusions might have operated as a 
shortcut that reduced the need for authentication, but it was 
nothing more. (Much of the time, indeed, both courts and 
attorneys may well have seen an expert’s disclosures as 
explicitly or implicitly coming in under a delineated hearsay 
exception, and reserved the argument that the evidence was not 
being introduced for the truth of its contents for those 
circumstances when either the evidence clearly required 
additional authentication to meet an exception, or when no 
exception applied.) 
Even when the evidence did not fall into a firmly rooted 
hearsay exception, under the earlier approach to the 
                                                          
50 The use of the exceptions delineated under FED. R. EVID. 803 does 
not require any showing of unavailability, unlike those delineated under FED. 
R. EVID. 804. As a matter of evidence law there is, therefore, no preference 
for non-hearsay as opposed to hearsay with respect to materials permitted 
under the 803 exceptions. 
51 Advisory Committee’s Note, FED. R. EVID. 703. 
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Confrontation Clause it could well still have been admissible. 
The question would then have been whether it could legitimately 
have been introduced under the residual exception, Rule 807, or 
the equivalent state provision. Rule 807 requires evidence to 
have “circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness” equivalent to 
those in place for the delineated hearsay exceptions. It could 
certainly be argued that the reasonable reliance by a qualified 
expert—especially, post-Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,52 coupled with the court’s determination 
of adequate reliability to warrant admissibility of the 
conclusions—would meet Rule 807’s requirements. At least as a 
technical matter, Rule 807’s requirement of “circumstantial 
guarantees of trustworthiness” equivalent to those found in the 
delineated hearsay exceptions might not be precisely the same as 
the “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” required under 
Roberts, but even if the contours of Confrontation Clause 
analysis were slightly different than those surrounding the use of 
the residual exception, the foundational questions motivating 
both inquiries were the same: necessity and reliability were the 
touchstones for both. Thus, meeting the one standard would 
usually, as a practical matter, mean meeting the other as well. 
Indeed, it was precisely the frequent conflation of the hearsay 
standard with the Confrontation Clause standard, coupled with 
an anxiety that a judicial determination of reliability was 
substituting for the constitutional guarantee of confrontation, that 
led commentators to argue—and the Court in Crawford to 
agree—that Confrontation Clause jurisprudence needed an 
overhaul. 
                                                          
52 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Daubert, the first of the Supreme Court’s 
trilogy on expert evidence, made clear that courts have a gatekeeping 
responsibility under the Federal Rules, in order to assure that expert evidence 
proffered at trial is sufficiently valid and reliable. Id. at 589. Daubert 
rejected the notion that the older Frye test, which focused on whether the 
expert evidence was “generally accepted” in the relevant expert community 
was incorporated into the Federal Rules, and instead, building upon a general 
gloss of the words “scientific . . . knowledge,” suggested a number of 
criteria (including “general acceptance” by which the courts could evaluate 
expert evidence). Id. at 584-87. 
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Thus, pre-Crawford, even if courts had abandoned the 
abracadabra of pronouncing some disclosures by experts to be 
admissible as non-hearsay, most basis evidence disclosed by 
experts would have been able to be introduced in some way, 
though the degree of necessary rigmarole and judicial scrutiny of 
the reliability of the statements would surely have increased. 
Permitting experts to disclose matters to the jury for the 
ostensibly non-hearsay purpose of helping them to evaluate the 
expert’s reasoning probably did not lead with great frequency to 
the disclosure of matters that could not have been introduced 
through some other logic as well. And even when it did, in a 
judicial environment in which the theoretical foundation of the 
Confrontation Clause was reliability (coupled to some extent 
with necessity), admitting purportedly reliable basis evidence 
was, as a conceptual matter, relatively unproblematic, whatever 
the awkward doctrinal logic through which it came in. 
Along comes Crawford. Because Crawford no longer uses 
reliability as a touchstone, the implicit justification for an 
approach that was never entirely coherent falls apart. Before 
Crawford, when courts indulged in the fiction that expert 
disclosures were introduced for a purpose distinct from the truth 
of the matter asserted, they were admitting evidence that often 
would have been admissible on some other grounds. Even if it 
would not have been able to fit another exception, assuming that 
the reliance by the expert was in fact reasonable, the evidence 
probably had as much of a structural guarantee of reliability as 
plenty of admissible hearsay.53 Given that reliability was the 
                                                          
53 Note that I am by no means suggesting that the materials relied upon 
by experts are generally reliable. I mean to express no view on this point. 
But I see no reason to believe that statements upon which qualified experts 
reasonably rely are any less likely to be reliable, as a general matter, than, 
say, excited utterances, or statements made for the purposes of medical 
diagnosis. To be sure, within a system of party-appointed adversarial experts, 
we may have good reason to be worried about whether expert reliance takes 
place in good faith, and there are no doubt many occasions on which highly 
compensated experts are prepared to rely on materials that are not, in fact, 
worthy of reliance. Still, the justification for Rule 703 is quite explicitly the 
likely reliability of the evidence, a justification structurally analogous to that 
supporting many of the Rule 803 hearsay exceptions. The empirical 
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animating concern of the doctrine, the “not for the truth of the 
contents” argument was a fiction, yes, but a fiction consistent 
with the underlying values animating how the Confrontation 
Clause was understood. 
Quite clearly, Crawford changes this analysis. When the 
focus on reliability is replaced by an inquiry into whether a 
statement is “testimonial,” the already doubtful justifications for 
the “not for the truth of its contents” argument for admitting 
experts’ basis evidence fall away entirely. The axes for analysis 
have shifted from reliability and necessity to an altogether 
different concern. Moreover, under Crawford, that some of this 
hearsay disclosed by an expert might also fit into a delineated 
and firmly rooted hearsay exception becomes irrelevant: no 
longer does whether an exception is firmly rooted make any 
difference to the constitutionality of hearsay introduced against a 
criminal defendant. If a basis statement upon which an expert 
relies is testimonial, its use is unconstitutional whether or not it 
also fits within a hearsay exception, and whether or not it is 
reliable. Given this, to pretend that expert basis statements are 
introduced for a purpose other than the truth of their contents is 
not simply splitting hairs too finely or engaging in an extreme 
form of formalism. It is, rather, an effort to make an end run 
around a constitutional prohibition by sleight of hand. 
Unfortunately, even after Crawford, courts in a number of 
jurisdictions are continuing to claim that expert’s basis evidence 
is introduced for a purpose other than the truth of its contents, 
in order to avoid confronting the potential Crawford problem 
with such testimony. The very first court to face the issue of 
expert basis evidence post-Crawford intimated that it could be 
introduced for the ostensibly non-hearsay purpose of explaining 
the expert’s testimony.54 A number of other courts have gone on 
                                                          
foundations of this assumption are open to question in both settings, but this 
gets well beyond the scope of my argument here. 
54 United States v. Stone, 222 F.R.D. 334 (E.D. Tenn. 2004). To be 
fair, in this case, it is not clear whether the court meant to permit only 
reliance (and disclosure at the opposing party’s discretion on cross-
examination), or was permitting disclosure on direct testimony as well 
(presumably subject to the balancing test of Rule 705). In Stone, a federal 
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to claim explicitly that when an expert discloses the basis for her 
opinions, no Crawford issue is raised, because she is merely 
introducing it to help the jury evaluate the expert’s testimony.55 
                                                          
district court admitted the expert testimony of an IRS agent in a criminal tax 
fraud case even though this testimony was based partly on statements made 
by company employees to a criminal tax investigator. The district court found 
that it was not clear from the record whether the defendant had an 
opportunity at the time these statements were made to cross-examine the 
declarants, nor was there evidence as to whether the declarants were 
presently unavailable to testify. Nonetheless, the court found no Confrontation 
Clause problem: 
Even if the particular Benton Manufacturing employees are 
not “unavailable” and even if the statements they gave to 
IRS criminal investigator Bohannan during the interviews 
Ms. Cantrel attended are “testimonial” as contemplated by 
the Court in Crawford, the statements may nevertheless be 
used by Ms. Cantrel in forming her expert opinions because 
they would not be used to establish the truth of the matters 
the employees asserted. Rather, if defense counsel were to 
elicit the statements from Ms. Cantrel on cross-examination, 
the purpose of the out-of-court statements would not be for 
hearsay purposes but rather would be for evaluating the 
merit of the opinions Ms. Cantrel offered on direct 
examination. Because Crawford explicitly maintained the 
Confrontation Clause’s inapplicability to statements used at 
trial for purposes other than establishing the truth of the 
matter asserted, Ms. Cantrel could rely on the employees’ 
statements in forming her opinions.  
On the one hand, Stone refers to eliciting the information on cross-
examination: if this is truly all the court means to permit, there is nothing 
problematic about this. Clearly the defense can if it chooses inquire into the 
basis for the prosecution’s experts’ conclusions on cross-examination. On the 
other hand, the logic of the court’s reasoning—that disclosing the statements 
could be for the purpose of assessing the merits of the opinions, and this is a 
purpose separate from the truth of the statements’ contents—would seem to 
apply equally to disclosure on direct examination, and hence, would intimate 
that such disclosure was not prohibited by Crawford. Moreover, the court 
seems to conflate expert use and expert disclosure. Though there may be an 
argument that Crawford should prevent not simply disclosure but expert 
reliance on testimonial evidence, this is surely a relatively separate question 
from, and a far closer question than, that of expert disclosure of testimonial 
evidence under the guise of claiming that it is not for the truth of its contents. 
55 See, e.g., People v. Thomas, 130 Cal. App. 4th 1202 (2005); State v, 
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In some of these cases, the “not for the truth of its contents” 
argument borders on the truly preposterous. Take for example, a 
series of cases in North Carolina about the admissibility of 
forensic science reports conducted by one expert, but introduced 
into evidence by someone other than the person who ran the 
tests and wrote the report. One such case was State v. Jones, in 
which a forensic chemist testified in court that a substance found 
in the defendant’s possession was cocaine. The basis for her 
conclusion was a laboratory analysis conducted by another agent 
who did not testify. The testifying witness detailed the testing 
methodology used by the nontestifying expert and explained that 
she reasonably relied on this test in concluding that the 
substance was cocaine. The laboratory report conducted by the 
other agent was also admitted by the trial court into evidence. 
Over the defendant’s objection that this violated the 
Confrontation Clause, the state appellate court in an unpublished 
opinion insisted that Crawford did not apply because the 
laboratory analysis was only “admitted to demonstrate the basis 
of the expert opinion . . . [and] not admitted for the purpose of 
proving the truth of the matter asserted.”56 
This is surely nonsense. The expert’s in-court testimony was, 
in essence, “this laboratory report written by someone else, 
which reports on the tests that were conducted, reliably informs 
me that the substance is cocaine, and therefore I can reliably 
inform you that it is cocaine.” In fact, the report and the 
accompanying notes were the testifying witness’ only basis for 
judging the substance to be cocaine. The expert’s judgment that 
the substance was cocaine could be accurate if and only if the 
report by the other nontestifying agent determining the substance 
to be cocaine was itself accurate. It cannot be seriously doubted 
that the report was coming in both to demonstrate the basis of 
the expert opinion and for the truth of its contents—if it were 
                                                          
Jones, 603 S.E.2d 168, 2004 WL 1964890 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) 
(unpublished opinion). State v. Delaney, 613 S.E.2d 699 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2005); State v. Lyles, 615 S.E.2d 890 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005); State v. Bunn, 
619 S.E.2d 918 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005). 
56 State v, Jones, 603 S.E.2d 168, 2004 WL 1964890 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2004) (unpublished opinion). 
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not true, the expert in fact had no basis at all for her conclusion. 
The expert was not even aggregating multiple disparate sources 
of evidence, or making novel inferences from the basis 
evidence—instead, he was basically parroting the conclusions 
reached in the report itself. One can sympathize with a court’s 
desire to permit the disclosure of basis evidence that is probably 
reliable, such as a routine analysis of drug composition. But to 
pretend that it is not being introduced for the truth of its 
contents simply strains all credibility. 
New York’s highest court has been the first court explicitly 
to reject the “not for the truth of its contents” argument with 
respect to expert basis evidence post-Crawford. In People v. 
Goldstein,57 the Court stated: 
The claim that the [statements made to Hegarty, the 
expert] were not hearsay is based on the theory that 
they were not offered to prove the truth of what the 
interviewees said. . . . Here, according to the People, 
the interviewees’ statements were not evidence in 
themselves, but were admitted only to help the jury in 
evaluating Hegarty’s opinion, and thus were not 
offered to establish their truth. We find the distinction 
the People make unconvincing. We do not see how 
the jury could use the statements of the interviewees 
to evaluate Hegarty’s opinion without accepting as a 
premise either that the statements were true or that 
they were false. Since the prosecution’s goal was to 
buttress Hegarty’s opinion, the prosecution obviously 
wanted and expected the jury to take the statements as 
true. Hegarty herself said her purpose in obtaining 
the statements was “to get to the truth.” The 
distinction between a statement offered for its truth 
and a statement offered to shed light on an expert’s 
opinion is not meaningful in this context.58 
In a relatively unusual move, the Goldstein court considered 
this issue sua sponte. But its answer was spot on: courts should 
                                                          
57 6 N.Y.3d 119 (2005). 
58 Id. at 127-28. 
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not be able to avoid analysis of the Crawford issues present 
when prosecution experts disclose the substance of their sources 
on direct examination, through the fictional claim that such 
statements are offered for a purpose other than their truth. 
I have addressed this argument in particular detail because it 
reflects such a dramatic temptation for courts facing the issue of 
expert basis evidence post-Crawford. While it would not, of 
course, provide a way around Crawford for certificates of 
analysis, it would essentially eliminate all expert basis issues 
from Crawford’s purview. If expert basis evidence is disclosed 
for a non-hearsay purpose, then any potential Crawford problem 
with its disclosure entirely disappears. And because this way of 
framing expert disclosure has been a longstanding legal fiction, 
it beckons seductively as a potential solution to these Crawford 
issues. But it is simply not possible for a jury to make use of an 
expert report that is disclosed as a source by another expert, or 
even of statements upon which the expert has relied, without 
first judging their likely accuracy. Unless a court can actually 
detail a chain of inferences that makes the disclosure useful for a 
genuinely non-hearsay purpose (i.e., a purpose that does not 
require a preliminary assessment of the likely accuracy of the 
source) then the seductive charms of this poorly reasoned 
argument should be resisted. 
In some post-Crawford cases, courts have made a subtler and 
more plausible argument—that Crawford does not prohibit 
experts from referring in fairly general terms to the kinds of 
sources on which they relied.59 When only the general nature of 
                                                          
59 See, e.g., In re Julio D., No. G033550, 2004 Cal. App. LEXIS 
10962, 2004 WL 2786375 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2004) (unpublished opinion 
reasoning that when information was “presented in generalized form as the 
basis for the experts’ opinions, Crawford was not violated”); People v. Ortiz, 
No. D042552, 2005 Cal App. LEXIS 3255, 2005 WL 851716, at *8 (Cal. 
Ct. App. Apr. 12, 2005) (unpublished opinion finding that an expert’s 
mention of and reliance on field investigation reports and other hearsay 
matters did not violate Crawford “because an expert is subject to cross-
examination about his or her opinions and additionally, the materials on 
which the expert bases an opinion are not elicited for the truth of their 
contents; they are examined to assess the weight of the expert’s opinion.” It 
is unclear from the opinion whether these field reports were simply 
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the sources is described, the argument that the information is 
introduced strictly to help the factfinder assess the expert’s 
testimony is stronger, especially when the expert has relied on 
an array of different kinds of sources, only some of which are 
even arguably testimonial. This argument, however, cannot 
justify a detailed recital of the substance of the testimonial 
evidence on which the expert has relied.60 
To be sure, some litigants might argue that if describing the 
general kinds of evidence is permissible for a non-hearsay 
purpose, then describing their contents ought also to be, for 
whatever use the former might have for helping the jury 
understand the expert is equivalently provided by the latter as 
well. In other words, if telling the jury that an expert’s opinion 
was based on five particular sources without detailing their 
actual contents might help the jury assess whether these sources 
are of a kind likely to provide useful information for the expert’s 
conclusions, the jury could use a substantive description of the 
five sources for this same purpose, without actually relying on a 
judgment about the truth of the contents. But this argument 
should fail. It is, in fact, structurally analogous to the argument 
                                                          
mentioned or whether their contents were described in detail; only the former 
could be justified as a non-hearsay use.). 
60 When the expert opinion consists of nothing beyond agreement with 
the conclusions of another expert’s report, this distinction between the nature 
of the expert’s sources and their content dissolves. If, in State v. Jones, No. 
COA03-976, 2004 WL 1964890 (N.C. Ct. App. Sept. 7, 2004) (unpublished 
opinion), for example, the court had permitted the expert to testify that the 
substance was cocaine and the basis of the expert’s conclusion was a careful 
examination of another expert’s toxicological report, that would, in essence, 
be disclosing the contents of this other report even if the report itself were 
not admitted. See also State v. Delaney, 613 S.E.2d 699 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2005) (permitting one expert to testify that he reviewed the methodology used 
by another in testing drugs, and relied on the colleague’s analysis to reach his 
judgment that the substances in question were marijuana and opium). In cases 
like these, distinguishing between category and content may be a distinction 
without a difference. However, in those many cases when an expert’s 
judgment derives from multiple testimonial inputs, permitting the expert to 
delineate the categories without disclosing the contents may be a sensible 
method for respecting Confrontation Clause values while simultaneously 
permitting expert reliance on inadmissible materials when reasonable. 
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the government attempted to make in Old Chief v. United 
States61: that because the government had a need to prove that 
the defendant had committed a prior felony as an element of a 
“felon in possession” charge in the present case, it ought also to 
be able to prove the name of the felony in question 
notwithstanding the defendant’s offer to stipulate the existence of 
his previous conviction. 
The Court in Old Chief appropriately rejected this argument, 
essentially acknowledging that while parties ought to have 
substantial leeway to prove their cases in the way they chose, at 
the same time, courts had to consider the existence of 
“evidentiary substitutes,” alternative ways to prove the same 
matter with equivalent probative value and less prejudicial 
impact.62 Just as in that case an offer to stipulate provided the 
equivalent probative value of naming the particular disclosed 
crime, while greatly lessening the danger of an unfairly 
prejudicial character inference, here too, describing the 
categories of evidence without detailing the contents reduces the 
chances that the jury will make substantive inferences about the 
truth of their contents, inferences which are impermissible under 
Crawford whenever the basis evidence is testimonial.  
In Old Chief, the Court recognized that the name of the prior 
felony committed by the defendant was relevant under Rule 401, 
because the felony, if introduced by name, would help prove 
that he violated the felon-in-possession law.63 But a stipulation 
                                                          
61 Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997). 
62 Id. As the Court put it: 
On objection, the court would decide whether a particular item 
of evidence raised a danger of unfair prejudice. If it did, the 
judge would go on to evaluate the degrees of probative value 
and unfair prejudice not only for the item in question but for any 
actually available substitutes as well. If an alternative were 
found to have substantially the same or greater probative value 
but a lower danger of unfair prejudice, sound judicial discretion 
would discount the value of the item first offered and exclude it 
if its discounted probative value were substantially outweighed 
by unfairly prejudicial risk. 
Id. at 182-83. 
63 Id. 
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or admission that the defendant had indeed previously been 
convicted of a felony that would count under the felon-in-
possession law, without providing the actual name of the prior 
felony, would have virtually the same probative value. This 
alternative form of proof had a side benefit: substantially 
reducing the danger that the jury would impermissibly think that 
because the defendant had committed an assault before, he was 
more likely to have committed this assault with which he was 
now charged—an impermissible character inference under our 
evidentiary rules.64 For permissible inferences, this evidentiary 
substitute was just as good, and it avoided providing information 
to the jury that it would be quite likely to misuse. 
A virtually identical argument applies with respect to expert 
basis evidence under Crawford. Even assuming that experts may 
legitimately disclose to the jury the kinds of information on 
which they have relied, this ought not to mean that they may 
disclose the substance of this basis when it is testimonial. To be 
sure, disclosing the substance of the expert’s basis evidence does 
also reveal the category, and hence, is strictly speaking relevant 
for the purpose of helping the expert to evaluate the legitimacy 
of the kinds of evidence made use of by the expert, just as the 
name of the felony was appropriately recognized by Souter as 
relevant in Old Chief. But just as prohibiting disclosure of the 
name of the felony in Old Chief protected the jury from 
impermissible inferences, disclosing only the category of 
testimonial expert basis evidence protects the jury from the 
danger that they will impermissibly attempt to assess the truth of 
the testimonial basis evidence without a chance to cross examine 
the actual declarant. 
1.  Business Records as an Exception to Crawford 
Many Courts have attempted to avoid Crawford’s strictures 
with respect to both forensic science reports and certificates of 
analysis by making recourse to a supposed business records 
                                                          
64 Id. For the rules governing character evidence, see generally Federal 
Rules of Evidence 404-405. 
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exception to the Confrontation Clause’s dictates.65 To be sure, 
Crawford does state that some hearsay is not testimonial. It 
notes that “[m]ost of the hearsay exceptions [recognized in 
1791] covered statements that by their nature were not 
testimonial—for example, business records or statements in 
furtherance of a conspiracy.”66 Certainly, a bill, a receipt, a 
demand letter, or other commercial writings not prepared with 
an eye toward criminal litigation would not be “testimonial” 
within the meaning of Crawford. But it is extravagant to read 
                                                          
65 See, e.g., Perkins, 897 So. 2d at 462–465 (finding that autopsy report 
fits into a business-record exception to Crawford ); Commonwealth v. Verde, 
827 N.E.2d 701, 703 (Mass. 2005) (calling drug certificate “akin to a 
business record”); People v. Durio, 794 N.Y.S.2d 863 (Sup. Ct. 2005) 
(exempting autopsy report from Crawford under business-record exception); 
State v. Thackaberry, 95 P.3d 1142, 1145 (Or. Ct. App. 2004) (reasoning 
that because a laboratory report “may be analogous to, or arguably even the 
same as, a business or official record,” it might not be testimonial under 
Crawford, and hence it was not plain error for the trial court to admit a 
toxicology report in the absence of an objection); Rollins v. State, 866 A. 
926 (Md. Ct. App. 2005) (autopsy report nontestimonial under business 
records exception so long as the findings reported are “routine, descriptive 
and not analytical,” but not if they report “contested conclusions”); United 
States v. Bahena-Cardenas, 411 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2005) (warrant of 
deportation nontestimonial because it was like other routine, objective public 
records, such as birth certificates) People v. Meras, No. F044043, 2005 WL 
1562735 (Cal. Ct. App. July 5, 2005) (unpublished opinion noting that DNA 
laboratory results are business records and hence not testimonial under 
Crawford); People v. Fajardo, No. F045640, 2005 WL 1683615 (Cal. Ct. 
App. July 18, 2005) (unpublished opinion); State v. Cutro, 618 S.E. 2d 890 
(S.C. 2005) (considering autopsy reports public records and hence non-
testimonial); State v. Windley, 617 S.E. 2d 682 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005); 
Green v. DeMarco, 812 N.Y.S. 2d 772 (Sup. Ct. 2005) (declaring 
foundational breath test certificates business records that do not implicate the 
core concerns of the Confrontation Clause despite an “incidental” litigation 
purpose); State v. Kronich, 128 P. 3d 119 (Wash Ct. App. 2006) (finding a 
department of licensing record asserting that defendant’s license was revoked 
nontestimonial as a business and/or public record); State v. Forte, 360 N.C. 
427, 435 (N.C. 2006) (asserting that business records, including forensic 
science laboratory reports, are nontestimonial because they “are neutral, are 
created to serve a number of purposes important to the creating organization, 
and are not inherently subject to manipulation or abuse.”) 
66 Crawford, 541 U.S, at 61. 
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this dictum as creating a generalized business-records exception 
to the application of Crawford. The fact that most business and 
public records are not testimonial does not exempt those that are 
from Crawford’s dictates. There is simply no logical basis for a 
per se business records exception to the reach of the 
Confrontation Clause. (Note, though, that Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, in his concurrence, elevates the dictum of the 
majority opinion into a genuine exception, writing, “To its 
credit, the Court’s analysis of ‘testimony’ excludes at least some 
hearsay exceptions, such as business records and official 
records.”67 But Rehnquist’s say-so does not make it so, and 
Rehnquist’s concurrence in the judgment is largely an argument 
against the majority’s approach, as he objects both to the 
substitution of the testimonial for the earlier inquiry into 
reliability, and the decision to create an “immutable category of 
excluded evidence.”68) 
Recall that the core idea of Crawford is that when the state 
procures evidence expected to be used as substantive evidence 
incriminating a criminal defendant, that evidence is testimonial. 
Forensic science laboratory reports are surely testimonial in this 
sense, and so are certificates of analysis. With the latter, in fact, 
their very raison d’etre is to be a substitute for testimony; they 
are overtly designed as a shortcut, a way to prove something 
without having to introduce live testimony. Both certificates of 
analysis and forensic test reports in general are made with an 
explicit eye toward eventual prosecution. Their purpose is to 
provide information that will be useful both to identify the 
perpetrator of a criminal act (through, for example, DNA 
identification, fingerprinting, or ballistics evidence), or to 
identify the criminality of an act (by, for example, analyzing 
drugs, or blood alcohol levels, or the cause of death of a 
victim), but in addition and concomitant with their investigatory 
purposes, these tests are surely conducted in significant part 
precisely in order to provide legal evidence in court. 
Forensic scientists and those requesting their services know 
                                                          
67 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 76 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
68 Id. at 74. 
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full well that the information may be used as testimony, and this 
is true regardless of whether the test is performed by 
government employees or an independent laboratory. As one of 
the few courts that has correctly deemed these tests testimonial 
wrote, “[b]ecause the test was initiated by the prosecution and 
generated by the desire to discover evidence against defendant, 
the results were testimonial.”69 
If courts continue to permit certificates of analysis and 
forensic evidence reports without requiring the testimony of their 
creator through a supposed business records exception, they will 
be eroding whatever claims to increased coherence Crawford 
appeared to offer. It is true that most business records are not 
produced in settings in which their future use as evidence is a 
primary purpose, and accordingly, most business records are 
therefore not testimonial. But records created by law 
enforcement personnel or those hired to provide support to law 
enforcement processes—a group that would surely include both 
state forensic scientists and those at private laboratories hired to 
perform forensic tests for the prosecution—ought to fall into the 
category of the “testimonial,” even if they are also appropriately 
understood to be business records for the purpose of the relevant 
hearsay exception. 
2.  Cross-Examination of the Expert as an Adequate Substitute 
for Cross-Examination of the Declarant 
Prior to Crawford, courts sometimes concluded that the 
opportunity to cross-examine the expert, rather than the hearsay 
declarant, satisfied Confrontation Clause concerns even when 
the basis evidence was disclosed by the expert on direct 
examination. After Crawford, this view is untenable; if the basis 
                                                          
69 People v. Rogers, 780 N.Y.S. 2d 393, 397 (App. Div. 2004); see 
also State v. Crager, 844 N.E.2d 390 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (rejecting the 
argument that all business records are exempt from Crawford); Belvin v. 
State, 922 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (rejecting the state’s 
argument that a breath test affidavit memorializing a nontestifying breath test 
technician’s procedures and observations in administering the test were 
nontestimonial hearsay). 
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for the expert’s testimony is “testimonial,” then substituted 
cross-examination cannot be constitutionally adequate. Several 
courts have nonetheless continued to suggest that expert 
disclosure of basis information does not raise Confrontation 
Clause concerns because the expert, though not the declarant, is 
available for cross-examination.70 
The idea that cross-examining the expert is an adequate 
substitute for confronting the expert’s sources directly is one of 
the rationales underlying Rule 703’s willingness to permit 
experts to rely on inadmissible information. This justification 
exists alongside a necessity justification, based upon the 
recognition that experts invariably rely in part on hearsay, in the 
books they have read, the courses they have studied, the 
experiences from which they have learned. One might therefore 
worry that if cross-examining the expert were not understood to 
be a substitute for cross-examining the underlying basis evidence 
itself, it could lead to a kind of infinite regress, a need to call 
witness after witness in order to get to the root of whatever it 
was that the expert relied upon. This fear, however, is 
unwarranted: even applying Crawford strictly, there is no grave 
danger that in order to satisfy Confrontation Clause concerns, 
the prosecutor would need to call a stream of additional 
                                                          
70 See, e.g., State v. Jones, 603 S.E.2d 168, 2004 WL 1964890 (N.C. 
Ct. App. Sept. 7, 2004) (unpublished opinion quoting with approval a pre-
Crawford state case emphasizing that the opportunity to cross-examine the 
expert satisfies the Sixth Amendment); State v. Leonard, No. 2004-1609, 
2005 WL 1039635 (La. Ct. App., Apr. 27, 2005) (defendant’s Confrontation 
Clause right was satisfied because he had an opportunity to cross-examine the 
prosecution’s expert, even though the testifying expert was not the one who 
had conducted the autopsy and written the autopsy report); State v. Delaney, 
613 S.E. 2d 699 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (finding no Crawford problem in part 
because the testifying expert was available for cross-examination about his 
reliance on the tests and reports performed by others); People v. Thomas, 
130 Cal. App. 4th 1202 (2005) (noting “the expert is subject to cross-
examination about his or her opinions”); State v. Durham, 625 S.E.2d 831, 
833 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (finding no violation of the confrontation right 
when the expert is available for cross-examination, notwithstanding the 
testifying expert’s reliance upon and disclosures regarding an autopsy 
conducted by others.). 
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witnesses to justify every matter upon which an expert has 
relied. Crawford, after all, applies only to testimonial evidence. 
Most general expertise gained through study, reading, and 
experience will not, in fact be testimonial, and even a good deal 
of case-specific information will frequently not be testimonial 
either. Hence, all of these matters can be relied upon by the 
expert and—subject to the application of Rule 705 or the state 
equivalent—even disclosed without triggering problems under 
Crawford. 
However, in those instances when an expert’s basis evidence 
is testimonial, cross-examining the expert cannot be deemed a 
constitutionally adequate substitute under Crawford for being 
able to confront whoever actually issued the testimonial 
statements. It is not that cross-examination of the expert about 
the basis will necessarily lack utility. Questioning the expert 
about the reasons for her reliance on the statements and the 
reasonableness of this reliance might well give a factfinder 
useful information for evaluating the likely reliability of both the 
expert and the underlying basis. But Crawford is quite clear: 
“Dispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously 
reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant 
is obviously guilty.”71 Cross-examining the expert cannot 
therefore satisfy Crawford’s requirements with respect to the 
testimonial basis evidence, any more than cross-examining a 
detective who took an affidavit can substitute for cross-
examining the declarant. Crawford’s language simply does not 
permit cross-examination of a surrogate when the evidence in 
question is testimonial.  
To see why this is so, imagine the same issue outside of the 
expert context: it is abundantly clear that under Crawford the 
policeman who interrogates a witness cannot testify about the 
substance of the witness’ statement in lieu of having the witness 
herself take the stand. If such substituted cross-examination were 
generally permitted, it would erode Crawford’s very 
foundations, for it would provide a way around confrontation of 
the witness herself in nearly all cases involving formalized 
                                                          
71 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62. 
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testimonial materials. Moreover, at least in the non-expert 
context, the substitute witness might be someone personally 
present when the affidavit or statement was made, and therefore 
someone with personal knowledge about its circumstances and 
context. By contrast, when one expert testifies on a report made 
by someone else, most of the time they were not even present 
when the tests reported on were conducted and memorialized! 
As I shall suggest in Part III, there may nonetheless be some 
reason to distinguish substituted cross-examination of an expert 
about a report from the substituted cross-examination of non-
expert witnesses, though the opinions permitting substituted 
cross-examination do not yet, for the most part, develop this 
point with any care. Perhaps over time, the Supreme Court will 
be willing to find that in some limited circumstances, the cross-
examination of an expert may substitute for the cross-
examination of his sources, even when the source’s statements 
do fit within the category of testimonial evidence. However, it is 
difficult to see how such an expansion could be wrought without 
a nod toward the same values that underpin Rule 703: reliability 
and necessity, both of which are rejected as justifications under 
Crawford. In any event, Crawford as written offers no plausible 
justification for this position; in Part III, I will begin to explore 
whether there are rational grounds for treating substituted cross-
examination differently in the context of expert testimony. 
3.  Crawford’s Impracticality 
Some courts have tried to justify their decisions that forensic 
science reports, other expert basis testimony, or certificates of 
analysis are not testimonial, even though they were produced 
explicitly for future use in the courtroom, by asserting that no 
matter what Crawford might seem to dictate, any other 
conclusion is simply too impracticable.72 Hauling every forensic 
                                                          
72 See, e.g., People v. Durio, 794 N.Y.S.2d 863 (Sup. Ct. 2005) 
(detailing impracticality of treating autopsy reports as testimonial hearsay, 
especially because they are non-replicable and so much time may pass 
between test and testimony that the medical examiner is unlikely to have 
independent recollection apart from the report itself); State v. Cunningham, 
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expert who writes a report into court to testify simply cannot be 
constitutionally required, they suggest, especially because 
routine forensic tests are likely in most circumstances to be 
reliable 
The quandary over these issues is understandable. It may be 
a significant drain on limited forensic science budgets to require 
that every forensic test be presented in court by whoever 
actually performed the test, unless that examiner is unavailable 
and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. 
In some cases, strictly complying with Crawford might be not 
just inconvenient but impossible. Many years can pass between 
the preparation of an autopsy report in a homicide case and the 
apprehension and trial of the perpetrator.73 By this point, the 
medical examiner who prepared the report might have moved 
out of state, changed professions, or even died. How can such a 
person testify or even provide an opportunity for cross-
examination? Certainly, as the Kansas Supreme Court pointed 
out, excluding an autopsy report in a case in which the 
pathologist who conducted the test years earlier is now 
unavailable or deceased is indeed a “harsh” result, considering 
that autopsies are conducted “in an environment where the 
medical examiner would have little incentive to fabricate the 
results.”74 
                                                          
903 So. 2d 1110 (La. 2005) (noting that twenty marijuana cases might be 
processed during each session of night court in Orleans Parish, and asserting 
that making defendants take a small procedural step (e.g., subpoenaing the 
testing expert) is reasonable because these matters “often are not in dispute”). 
73 See Durio, 794 N.Y.S.2d at 863. 
74 State v. Lackey, 120 P. 3d 332, 351 (Kan. 2005). As another court 
put it, “[a]t oral argument, in this Court, defense counsel was given a 
hypothetical about a situation in which the maker of an autopsy report dies 
before the date of trial. Defense counsel stated that, even in that situation, the 
maker of the autopsy report would still be required to meet Crawford 
standards, and in the maker’s absence, the State would be required to prove 
the victim’s death in another manner. This is unacceptable in practical 
application.” Rollins v. State, 897 A.2d 821 (Md. 2006). Note that it may 
not be quite so clear as the Lackey court would have it that medical 
examiners have little incentive to fabricate. While the vast majority of 
forensic professionals no doubt perform their jobs with care and integrity, the 
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Following Crawford strictly can seem especially nonsensical 
when there is little chance that the actual declarant, the author of 
the forensic report, will still have any independent memory of 
conducting the test by the time of trial, either because many 
years have passed or because the volume of similar tests makes 
it unlikely that the expert will retain a specific memory of the 
one in question. In this case, any expert who testifies about the 
report will most likely be relying wholly on what has been 
memorialized within the report itself. When this recognition 
combines with the widespread and often (though by no means 
always) warranted belief that forensic science tests are likely to 
be conducted in a reliable manner, excluding the autopsy, blood 
analysis, or whatever test is at issue because the declarant is 
unavailable may seem like constitutional overkill. 
The inefficiency of requiring live testimony from the actual 
person who conducted the test may point to a cogent critique of 
Crawford’s formalism. However, Crawford is quite explicit on 
this point: 
Admitting statements deemed reliable by a judge is 
fundamentally at odds with the right of confrontation. 
To be sure, the Clause’s ultimate goal is to ensure 
reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather 
than a substantive guarantee. It commands, not that 
evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in 
a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of 
cross-examination.75 
Moreover, within the judicial hierarchy, it is not for trial 
courts to reject the Supreme Court’s test simply because of its 
impracticable, or even harsh, consequences. 
Even taking Crawford’s dictates seriously, the fact that 
experts can rely on inadmissible evidence without disclosing it 
would often permit a surrogate expert to express a conclusion to 
                                                          
close connections between forensic scientists and the prosecution can create 
structural incentives for the forensic scientists to produce results that please 
the prosecution—and in some cases this has indeed even meant fabrication. 
75 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61. 
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the jury based on the inadmissible report.76 Although the jury 
would not be able to see or hear about the details of the report 
itself, Crawford does not prohibit some expert other than the 
declarant from considering the report in the course of her expert 
evaluation. Perhaps over time Courts will find a way to hone 
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence to permit disclosure in 
certain circumstances, especially when the report’s author is 
genuinely unavailable, but for the moment, refusing to apply 
Crawford simply because of its impractical consequences should 
not be a legitimate option for the lower courts.77 
4.  Disclosure of Objective or Factual Results 
Several courts have attempted to distinguish matters of 
opinion and judgment from factual, unambiguous, and objective 
reports. In State v. Lackey,78 for example, the Kansas Supreme 
Court distinguished between “factual, routine, descriptive and 
nonanalytical findings,” which it deemed non-testimonial, and 
“contested opinions, speculations and conclusions derived from 
these objective findings,” which the court viewed as 
                                                          
76 For examples of this argument, see Louisiana v. Garner, 913 So. 2d 
874 (La Ct. App. 2005) (emphasizing that testifying witness was rendering 
his own opinion and judgment, not merely repeating the autopsy report 
prepared by another); State v. Barton, 700 N.W. 2d 93, 97 (Wisc. Ct. App. 
2005) (holding that confrontation right is satisfied “if a qualified expert 
testifies as to his or her independent opinion, even if the opinion is based in 
part on the work of another.”). In Barton, however, while the trial court did 
not admit the report itself, it did permit the witness to testify about the test 
performed by the non-testifying expert, the procedures used and the results 
achieved. This degree of detail cannot be justified under Crawford. 
77 See, e.g., People v. Orpin, 796 N.Y.S.2d 512, 517 (Just. Ct. 2005) 
(recognizing the practical concerns but pointing out that “the current Court’s 
formalistic approach to interpreting the guarantees of the Sixth Amendment 
provides little room for accommodation of the pragmatic issues its decisions 
might raise in the day-to-day administration of criminal justice.”). However, 
this opinion was attacked collaterally in Green v. DeMarco, 812 N.Y.S.2d 
772 (Sup. Ct. 2005) (holding that although not all business records can be 
admitted as nontestimonial under Crawford, a statutorily mandated 
maintenance certificate for a breath testing machine can be). 
78 120 P. 3d 332 (Kan. 2005). 
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testimonial.79 These courts are, in essence, narrowing the 
applicability of the business records exception to the hearsay 
rule as an escape valve under Crawford.  Instead of finding that 
business records are per se exempt from the testimonial, they 
are taking a closer look at the nature of the record. These courts 
believe facts and objective findings by experts are admissible 
even without an opportunity for confrontation, whereas opinions 
and inferences should be redacted from a report and excluded 
unless Crawford’s dictates are met. 
The core idea underlying these opinions is that the more a 
laboratory finding looks like a factual observation, “an objective 
finding which would have been observed and recorded by any 
trained individual in that field,” the less useful cross-
examination is likely to be.80 The underlying logic asks: when 
there is not room for judgment, interpretation, or difference in 
opinion, what precisely would be gained by pressing the 
recorder on the stand about the matter recorded?  In addition, 
there is obviously a strong reliability undercurrent underpinning 
these opinions, a belief that the more straightforward and 
unambiguous the matter recorded, the more confident we can be 
that the methods and processes used to make the record can help 
to assure its reliability.81 
                                                          
79 Id. at 351; see also United States v. Bahena Cardenas, 411 F.3d 1067, 
1075 (9th Cir. 2005) (warrant of deportation not testimonial because it was 
“routine, objective, cataloging of an unambiguous factual matter”); Rollins v. 
State, 866 A.2d 926, 948 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005), aff’d, 897 A.2d 821 
(finding no Confrontation Clause concern for statements of fact conditions 
objectively ascertained); North Carolina v. Huu the Cao, 626, S.E.2d. 301, 
305 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that laboratory reports are nontestimonial 
business records “only when the testing is mechanical. . . and the information 
contained in the documents are objective facts not involving opinions or 
conclusions drawn by the analyst.”); State v. Melton, 625 S.E.2d 609, 612 
(N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (forensic science reports are nontestimonial business 
records if they report “objective fact obtained through a mechanical means”). 
80 People v. Mellott, No. 1173-05, 2005 WL 3322843 (N.Y. Just. Ct., 
2005). 
81 This is on occasion explicit. See, e.g., Rollins, 897 A.2d 821; People 
v. Fajardo, No. F045640, 2005 WL 1683615 (Cal. Ct. App. Jul 18, 2005) 
(unreported opinion finding demeanor evidence would not be helpful to assess 
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However, there is less to these arguments than meets the 
eye. First, the reliability justification, while perhaps intuitively 
appealing, is explicitly taken off the table in Crawford itself. 
Crawford’s critique of Ohio v. Roberts is precisely that it 
permitted “a jury to hear evidence, untested by the adversary 
process, based on a mere judicial determination of reliability,” 
and Crawford explicitly rejected such “surrogate means” for 
assessing reliability.82 Moreover, having a judge make a 
determination about whether the matter is fact or opinion, 
unambiguous or subject to interpretation, analytical or 
nonanalytical is, in essence, delegating to the judge the power to 
decide whether cross-examination and confrontation are 
warranted in a particular instance. This seems as unjustifiable 
under Crawford’s approach as a direct judicial determination of 
reliability. In addition, the premise is itself controversial: the 
idea that descriptive and non-analytical findings are not 
themselves open to differences in judgment or interpretation is 
itself a matter upon which people’s reasonable judgments may 
differ. And certainly, given the disclosure of a number of 
scandals in which “factual” reports of forensic science 
laboratories or medical examiners turned out to have been faked 
or otherwise misreported,83 it is not plausible to say that in no 
circumstance could confrontation and cross-examination be 
helpful with respect to seemingly unambiguous factual findings 
contained in laboratory reports.  
Furthermore, the logic, if taken seriously, would extend well 
beyond the forensic science setting. The claim of a bystander, 
made to a policeman interrogating witnesses after a bank 
robbery has concluded, that he saw three men wearing grey 
                                                          
report’s credibility). 
82 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61. 
83 See, e.g., Richard L. Fricker, Pathologist’s Plea Adds to Turmoil: 
Discovery of Possibly Hundreds of Faked Autopsies Helps Defense 
Challenges, A.B.A.J., Mar. 1993, at 24; U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of the 
Inspector General, The FBI DNA Laboratory: A Review of Protocol and 
Practice Vulnerability (2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/ 
0405/final.pdf; Jim Yardley, Doubts on Evidence Put Oklahoma City Police 
Scientist Under Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2001. 
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overcoats and masks enter the bank at 10:30 a.m. is every bit as 
factual and non-analytic as a forensic report. And yet just about 
any judge would recognize that such statements surely fall 
squarely into the category of the testimonial under Crawford. 
Attempting to graft an inquiry into whether the matter at issue is 
factual or interpretive onto Crawford’s focus on the testimonial 
would either lead to enormous inconsistencies across categories, 
exclude large amounts of testimonial evidence from the purview 
of the Confrontation Clause, or both. 
 
 * * * 
In this Section, I have described a variety of judicial efforts 
to continue to permit both certificates of analysis and the 
disclosure of expert reports and other basis evidence even when 
the declarant is not available on the stand. None of these 
arguments, however, is persuasive. Some of them—such as 
arguing that basis evidence is not hearsay because it is not being 
introduced for the truth of its contents, or suggesting that there 
is a per se business records exception, or that Crawford should 
treat factual claims different from opinions—are intellectually 
incoherent. The claim that Crawford is impractical may be 
accurate, but it is not actually an argument—it is better, perhaps, 
considered as a plea for reconsidering Crawford’s scope, or as a 
call for the development of arguments that could mitigate its 
consequence. Perhaps an argument can be made to distinguish 
substituted cross-examination in the expert context, but it is 
simply untenable that Crawford could mean that substituted 
cross-examination is, as a general matter, a legitimate alternative 
for cross-examining the hearsay declarant: this would permit any 
testimonial statement into court so long as someone present 
when the earlier statement was made is on the stand to answer 
questions about it! 
One of the key purposes of this Article is to invite the lower 
courts to rethink their willingness to rely on these arguments. 
There are already sufficiently large numbers of cases relying 
upon precisely these arguments that some courts are, 
unfortunately, beginning not even to argue these points with 
care, instead merely relying on the allegedly persuasive 
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authority of other courts’ reasoning. If this trend continues, it 
will have a real cost: a too-thoughtless pragmatism will have 
trumped principled application of the underlying principle at 
stake in Crawford. In a great many cases, the forensic evidence 
against a defendant may in fact be the most powerful proof on 
offer by the prosecution. Moreover, forensic science evidence 
has, to some degree, been under attack for having significantly 
less rigorous scientific foundations than most would presume, 
and there have been more than a few recent scandals involving 
overclaimed results or downright fraud. These forms of expert 
testimony should not, for Confrontation Clause purposes, get a 
free pass, or be presumed because of their subject matter to be 
outside of Crawford’s dictates. 
III.  TOWARD A MORE NUANCED UNDERSTANDING OF 
TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE AND ITS LIMITS IN THE CONTEXT OF 
EXPERT TESTIMONY 
What, then, is the alternative? One alternative is simple and 
obvious: recognize certificates of analysis and the disclosure of 
some basis evidence by experts as testimonial. While many 
courts have attempted to find ways around Crawford’s seemingly 
expansive approach to the Confrontation Clause, a minority of 
courts have been willing to recognize that some expert basis 
testimony or reports and documents prepared by experts are 
indeed testimonial.84 In a sense, these courts’ analyses are 
                                                          
84 See, e.g., People v. Goldstein, 843 N.E. 2d 727 (Ct. App. N.Y. 
2005); People v. Pena, 128 Cal. App. 4th 1219 (2005) (finding a statement 
by a co-defendant that implied that an attack was gang related and implicating 
members of a particular gang was admitted, and relied upon by expert, in 
violation of Crawford ); People v. Rogers, 780 N.Y.S.2d 393 (App. Div. 
2004) (finding a blood alcohol test done on a rape victim to be testimonial 
and not admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule); 
People v. Hernandez, 794 N.Y.S.2d 788 (Sup. Ct. 2005) (finding a report by 
an unavailable latent fingerprint examiner to be testimonial and hence 
excluded under Crawford); City of Las Vegas v. Walsh, 124 P.3d 203 (Nev. 
2005 (finding the affidavit of a healthcare professional to be testimonial); 
Napier v. State, 820 N.E.2d 144 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (finding the admission 
of defendant’s breath test results without live testimony of officer who 
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among the most straightforward. They often simply ask whether 
the statement was a pretrial statement that the declarant would 
reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially; if the answer is 
affirmative, they find that Crawford applies.85 In addition, 
several of these opinions have usefully and appropriately 
challenged the assumption that seems to inform many of the 
other cases; that cross-examination of the declarant who 
conducted a routine laboratory test is unlikely to be helpful.86 
In recognizing that such evidence is indeed testimonial, and 
thus problematic under Crawford, these courts are initiating an 
important line of analysis. They should be lauded for facing the 
issues raised by Crawford head-on, for confronting 
                                                          
conducted test to violate Crawford); Shiver v. State, 900 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (finding an affidavit about a breath test to be 
testimonial); Ohio v. Crager, 2005 Ohio 6868 (2005) (DNA test is 
testimonial); Belvin v. State, 922 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) 
(portions of breath test affidavit pertaining to nontestifying breath test 
technician’s procedures and observations in administering test were 
testimonial hearsay requiring prior opportunity for cross-examination under 
Crawford); State v. Carpenter, 882 A.2d 604 (Conn. 2005) (testimonial, but 
introduction was harmless error); State v. Berezansky, 899 A.2d 306 (N.J. 
Super Ct. 2006) (blood analysis testimonial). 
85 See, e.g., State v. Crager, 844 N.E.2d 390 (2005) (DNA test is 
testimonial because “a reasonable person could conclude that the report 
would later be available for use at trial”); State v. Berezansky, 899 A.2d 306 
(N.J. Super. Ct. 2006) (finding introduction of laboratory analysis of blood 
without live testimony to be a Confrontation Clause violation because it was 
introduced “to prove an element of the crime and offered in lieu of producing 
the qualified individual who actually performed the test.”). 
86 See, e.g., State v. Berezansky, 899 A.2d 306 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2006) 
(noting that neither the neutrality nor the reliability of a state laboratory 
analysis can be presumed); People v. Orpin, 796 N.Y.S.2d 512, 517 (Just. 
Ct. 2005) (noting “the truth seeking value of cross-examination in this 
context is not merely theoretical. Substantial problems with DWI testing in 
this state were uncovered in the 1990s, and there have also been recent 
problems even with reliability of the FBI laboratory’s analyses. Subjecting the 
persons who conduct these calibration tests to the ‘crucible of cross 
examination’ will help ensure the reliability of their work and protect the 
integrity of the judicial system by avoiding convictions based on faulty breath 
test results.”), collaterally attacked, Green v. DeMarco, 812 N.Y.S.2d 772 
(Sup. Ct. 2005). 
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Confrontation Clause concerns without subterfuge. This 
approach is without a doubt the most consistent with the 
constitutional logic that underlies Crawford itself. 
By contrast, as the previous Part showed, the great majority 
of courts analyzing expert disclosure issues under Crawford are, 
by hook or by crook, holding that these disclosures are not 
testimonial under Crawford. To get there, they are sometimes 
forced to make arguments that overreach any reasonable 
interpretation of Crawford (e.g., the business records exception); 
rely on distinctions that Crawford’s analysis suggests should not 
be meaningful (e.g., objective/subjective; substituted cross-
examination); or invent distinctions without logical foundation 
(e.g., arguing that disclosure is not for the truth of its contents). 
Unfortunately, the arguments on offer to evade Crawford are not 
logically coherent, and sometimes even border on the 
disingenuous. Furthermore, these solutions are reminiscent of 
the very approach to the Confrontation Clause that Crawford 
was attempting to eliminate—an effort to use categorical labels 
without analysis as a substitute for the protection of the value of 
cross-examination. It would seem, therefore, that testimonial 
basis evidence and certificates of analysis ought to be prohibited 
under this new approach to Confrontation. 
And yet… 
Perhaps there is still more to say. While recognizing that 
some expert basis evidence and certificates of analysis do meet 
any coherent definition of the testimonial, at the same time, it is 
difficult not to sympathize with the frustration of the Kansas 
Supreme Court in State v. Lackey at the thought of excluding an 
autopsy report whose author had died before trial. Even if 
general hand-waving in the direction of “impracticality” seems 
strikingly inconsistent with Crawford’s bright-line rule approach, 
the impulse to find some way around Crawford’s dictates, for at 
least some subset of these cases, is not only strong, but 
understandable. 
One way to put the point is this: even if we must reject a 
vague claim of impracticality as a justification for dispensing 
with what Crawford seems otherwise to require, is there any 
degree to which practicality and efficiency concerns do 
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legitimately intersect with the Confrontation right? Are there 
ever times when Confrontation should be dispensed with even 
for evidence that is testimonial—either because it is practically 
impossible or because it is highly inconvenient and extremely 
unlikely to be useful, or both? This is one of Rehnquist’s chief 
concerns in his concurrence: that the court has lost sight of the 
link between cross-examination and likely accuracy; that “[b]y 
creating an immutable category of excluded evidence, the Court 
adds little to a trial’s truth-finding function.”87 
The difficulty is that for the judge to make this decision—to 
decide that this is a circumstance in which cross-examination is 
unlikely to yield benefits or to increase accuracy appears to be 
precisely what Crawford disallows: “Where testimonial 
statements are at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient 
to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution 
actually prescribes: confrontation.”88 
So where are we left? If we return to the beginning, and 
look at the kind of information that is problematic under 
Crawford, just how impractical would it be to apply Crawford 
strictly? How often would it be merely an inconvenience? What 
are the circumstances in which it is likely to be not merely an 
annoyance but a serious problem of proof?  In what settings, if 
any, is Crawford intellectually troubling if taken to its logical 
extreme? 
As I indicated in Part I, in most circumstances, complying 
with Crawford would be an inconvenience, but no worse. It 
would mean that the actual authors of forensic science reports 
would have to testify about them in court in order to introduce 
them into evidence. It would further mean that the use of 
certificates of analysis would have to be substantially curtailed. 
These would be inconveniences, to be sure, though in the many 
cases in which the matters established by, say, a certificate of 
analysis were uncontested, defendants might well frequently be 
prepared to waive their confrontation clause rights and nothing 
in Crawford suggests the impermissibility of waiver. While not 
                                                          
87 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 75. 
88 Id. at 69. 
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meaning to devalue the extent to which a strict application of 
Crawford might be irritating both to prosecutors and forensic 
scientists, to generally exempt these categories of evidence from 
the category of the testimonial would be intellectually 
unjustifiable under Crawford’s own logic. 
To be sure, Rehnquist’s question—how much gain in 
accuracy do we purchase through the application of this strict 
rule?—is a fair one. But the ability to cross-examine the actual 
creator of a forensic science report, for example, rather than 
merely cross-examining another expert who has done no more 
than eyeball the report, could well reveal additional weaknesses, 
discrepancies, or other reasons to have less confidence in the 
evidence than would otherwise have been apparent. There is no 
reason to believe that the matters upon which experts rely ought 
to be intrinsically exempt from Crawford’s dictates when they 
are disclosed. 
However, there are certain subcategories of evidence that 
would be banned under this strict application that might make us 
think that Crawford itself needs some kind of modification, lest 
it become formalism without any clear benefit or purpose. Two 
of these deserve particular mention. 
First, one line of cases has struggled with whether certain 
kinds of fairly routine, ministerial documentation ought to be 
subject to Crawford. For example, breath test machines are 
typically required by statute to be calibrated on a regular basis, 
and when they are calibrated, the technician who does so 
typically fills out a form certifying that the calibration has been 
completed. Thus the issues arises: in a DUI case, can the 
document certifying that the machine was properly calibrated be 
admitted without giving the defendant the opportunity to 
confront the human being who conducted the calibration? Does 
it really make sense that the Constitution requires the prosecutor 
to haul into court the technician who filled out this form, to 
confirm that she did what the certificate claims? When we 
require the person who is simply doing quality assurance tests 
on the machinery to come into court for each and every DUI 
trial, we may truly have gone too far. 
Why so? What is the difference between calibrating an 
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Intoxilyzer machine and conducting a DNA test? The most 
salient distinction is that the former is done without a focus on 
any particular case. As a number of courts have recognized, 
while the records created to establish calibration are made in 
expectation that they will be available for use in criminal trials, 
they are not created with an eye to any particular trial, any 
particular crime, or any particular defendant. This is in sharp 
contrast to certificates reporting the result of a particular breath 
test and the circumstances in which it was conducted. These, 
unlike the calibration records, make an accusation. The 
calibration evidence neither exculpates nor inculpates; it is, 
rather, a foundational requirement statutorily required in order 
to use the machine for evidentiary purposes. 
In fact, almost all of the courts who have confronted breath 
test calibration evidence have found it not to be testimonial. 
Some of these courts have partly relied on some mixture of the 
arguments described in the previous section. Several of these 
arguments—such as the alleged business records exception to 
Crawford, or the claim that because these are “objective” 
findings rather than subjective—prove far too much. If those 
arguments apply here, where do they stop, and why? 
But a number of the opinions concerning calibration evidence 
and other forms of routine, non-case specific documentation 
have begun to develop a significantly more promising way 
around Crawford in circumstances such as these, building on the 
notion that the application of the Confrontation Clause, even 
post-Crawford is limited to accusations against the defendant. If 
evidence is developed not for any particular case, not with an 
eye toward inculpating any particular defendant, but rather as 
part of the routine quality control processes of law enforcement, 
perhaps it is not appropriate to deem it “testimonial” in the first 
place.  Certainly breath test calibration certifications are made 
with an eye toward the courtroom; it is not only foreseeable that 
they will be used as evidence, but it is one of their most 
important purposes. But as one court points out, “[u]nlike police 
or prosecutorial interrogators, the technicians have no 
demonstrable interest in whether the certifications produce 
evidence that is favorable or adverse to a particular 
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defendant.”89 The certifications are “not done for the purpose of 
any particular prosecution.”90 They contain “the power to 
exonerate as well as convict”—after all, the breath test can 
exculpate only if it is in proper working order.91 They accuse no 
one in particular of anything in particular, and in this sense they 
are “neutral in character.”92 Indeed, these certifications often 
pre-date the criminal act itself. If they lack an “accusatory 
purpose,” then perhaps their use without the opportunity to 
confront does not violate the Confrontation Clause.93 
This line of argument is an intriguing method for potentially 
limiting the Confrontation Clause’s reach. It is, of course, in 
part a response to concerns about practicality, but it is a 
response anchored within a framework for understanding the 
purposes of confrontation, rather than using practicality as an 
argument in its own right. Crawford itself does not suggest that 
whether a statement is accusatory bears on whether it is 
testimonial—indeed, the word “accusation” or “accusatorial” 
does not appear in either Crawford or Davis.94 Nonetheless, this 
is a potential direction in which the doctrine could develop that 
could substantially be reconciled with Crawford’s present 
structure.95 If the court made explicit that only evidence that was 
                                                          
89 State v. Norman, 125 P.3d 15, 19 (Or. Ct. App. 2005); see also 
Michels v. Commonwealth, 624 S.E.2d 675 (Va. Ct. App. 2006). 
90 People v. Krueger, 804 N.Y.S.2d 908 (Just. Ct. 2005). 
91 State v. Forte, 629 S.E.2d 137, 143 (N.C. 2006); see also 
Commonwealth v. Walther, 189 S.W.3d 570, 575 (Ky. 2006). 
92 Green v. DeMarco, 812 N.Y.S.2d 772, 783 (Sup. Ct. 2005). 
93 People v. Durio, 794 N.Y.S.2d 863 (Sup. Ct. 2005); see also, e.g., 
Bohsancurt v. Eisenberg, 129 P.3d 471 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006). 
94 There are, however, numerous references in the opinion to 
confronting one’s “accusers.”  See generally, Crawford, 448 U.S. at 36.   
95 For an argument in favor of an “accusatorial’” approach to the 
Confrontation Clause, see §6371.2 of 30A Wright & Graham, Federal 
Practice and Procedure: Evidence (Pocket Part, 2007), also available in draft 
as Kenneth Graham, The Short(?) Happy(?) Life of Crawford v. Washington, 
at http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1033&context=uc
lalaw); see also Robert P. Mosteller, “Testimonial” and the Formalistic 
Definition—The Case for an “Accusatorial” Fix, 20 CRIM. JUST., Summer 
2005, at 14. 
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created to bear witness against the perpetrator of a particular 
criminal act fit into the category of the testimonial, then these 
calibration records could legitimately fall outside of the 
Confrontation Clause’s purview. Limiting the Confrontation 
Clause’s operation to accusations, broadly defined, would not be 
inconsistent with the principles that underlie Crawford. 
This approach would create a new set of questions 
surrounding the definition of an accusation.96 Is a DNA test 
determining that two samples match an accusation? What about 
an autopsy report? Should accusations consist only of those 
statements that literally accuse a specific person of an act, or 
should they reach all testimonial evidence created for the 
purpose of either adducing evidence useful for prosecuting a 
particular trial or investigating a specific criminal act? Only the 
latter, I would suggest, is justifiable; otherwise, Crawford’s 
scope would be tremendously and unjustifiably narrowed. 
(Imagine, for example, police interviews with victims of a 
burglary, in which the victims describe what was taken, the state 
of their home, et cetera, but make no literal accusation against a 
specific person. Surely such statements should still be 
testimonial; they are developed for the investigation of a 
particular case, even if the statement does not accuse a named 
human being of a criminal act. Similarly, forensic science 
evidence produced for a specific case should be testimonial even 
if, like an autopsy report, it may not accuse a particular person.) 
Under such an appropriately broad definition, most laboratory 
reports would still remain testimonial. But it would mean that 
routine equipment checks and quality assurance methods 
engaged in by forensic science laboratories could, depending on 
statutory requirements, be introduced by certificate rather than 
through live testimony notwithstanding the Confrontation Clause. 
One could certainly argue against such a limitation to the 
testimonial. After all, only if the machine is properly calibrated 
can its test results be relied upon; indeed, considering how 
                                                          
96 For a sharply worded critique emphasizing the manipulability of the 
idea of an accusation, see the dissenting opinion in Luginbyhl v. 
Commonwealth, 628 S.E. 2d. 74, 81-82 (Va. Ct. App. 2006). 
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automatic in operation breath test machines have become, the 
chance to cross-examine about calibration could arguably seen 
more important than the opportunity to cross-examine the person 
who conducted the actual breath test. Breath tests themselves 
have virtually become “black boxes”—an officer simply inputs a 
driver’s license, the suspect breathes into the machine, and a 
breath ticket pops out indicating the alcohol level found through 
the test process. For the officer conducting such a test, there is 
virtually no room for the exercise of discretion or judgment. 97 
But this reported breath alcohol level will of course only be 
accurate if the machine is properly calibrated and in working 
order, so one could argue that issues of maintenance and 
calibration are at least as salient as the particular result spit out 
by the machine.  
My purpose here, however, is not to argue whether 
calibration records ought to fall within or outside the boundaries 
of the testimonial. Rather, I simply wish to show that this is one 
place where there is an intellectually viable argument for 
excluding them from the definition of the testimonial—and to 
suggest that if we believe that they ought to be excluded from 
Confrontation Clause protections, it would be far better to 
develop a principled limitation to Crawford than to jimmy up a 
general business records exception that makes no intellectual 
sense. 
The second, and frankly still more concerning, circumstance 
under Crawford occurs when the maker of a forensic science 
report is genuinely unavailable. While it may be troubling to 
have the prosecutor elect not to call the expert who conducted 
the test, how ought the analysis to change if the expert is no 
longer living, or no longer works for the laboratory in question? 
When the expert is genuinely unavailable through no fault of the 
prosecution, exclusion of the test under the Confrontation Clause 
because of the defendant’s inability to confront its maker might 
seem an excessively strict interpretation of what the Constitution 
                                                          
97 This description applies, for example, to the BAC Datamaster breath 
testing machines which are used in Los Angeles County. Thanks are due to 
Barry Fisher and Catherine Navetta of the Los Angeles County Crime 
Laboratory for showing me how these machines operate.  
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requires. This is especially so when the test has been conducted 
far enough in the past (such as, for example, an autopsy 
conducted years before the suspect was apprehended) that even 
were she available, the expert who conducted it is very unlikely 
to have any independent memory of what he or she put to paper 
so long ago. In this circumstance, cross-examination is unlikely 
to be particularly fruitful; the initial test was conducted in 
circumstances that give little reason for fabrication; and other 
experts can at least report on the plausibility of the finding and 
their appropriate interpretation. 
Let us return to the example of an autopsy conducted in the 
distant past. Imagine, for example, an autopsy appropriately 
conducted by the medical examiner, and further imagine that key 
findings are not only reported on but carefully measured, 
documented, and photographed. Now imagine that a decade 
passes, or even longer, and a suspect is finally located. 
Meanwhile, the medical examiner has died. Frankly, even were 
she still living, how likely is it that she would have a usefully 
specific memory of conducting that autopsy, separate from what 
she had recorded? In addition, the careful documentation can be 
interpreted by other qualified experts, perhaps almost as well as 
she would have been able to interpret it herself. When (1) the 
expert is truly unavailable; (2) even if the expert were available, 
it is not likely that she would have an independent memory of 
what she recorded; and (3) the evidence was created in 
circumstances that suggest its likely (though of course not 
certain) trustworthiness, does Crawford truly mean that we must 
nonetheless exclude this test? Must the autopsy conducted a 
decade or two earlier by a now-deceased medical examiner 
actually be excluded? 
This result would indeed seem troubling. The autopsy report 
is the best present evidence we have about the cause and 
circumstances of the victim’s death. There is no way to conduct 
the test again at the present time. And the reason that so much 
time has passed—increasing the odds of both the unavailability 
of the medical examiner and the lack of memory even were she 
available—is precisely because the perpetrator has managed to 
evade the law. 
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And yet the autopsy report, unlike the calibration records, 
really does squarely fit into the category of the testimonial. This 
cannot and should not be doubted. It is created as part of an 
ongoing investigation in order to produce evidence. It is 
prepared with an eye toward future criminal prosecution. 
Though we may not know at the time it is conducted against 
whom it will serve as testimony, it is meant to serve as 
testimony against someone in particular, the perpetrator of the 
murder. If it is introduced without the testimony of the person 
who created it, the report is indeed being used as a surrogate for 
testimony. 
To be sure, most courts confronting autopsy reports are 
electing not to deem them testimonial, again, largely by using a 
business records exception or deciding that objective findings are 
not subject to Crawford. The Court has thus far rejected several 
certiorari petitions on precisely the question of whether autopsy 
reports are testimonial; eventually, however, this is certainly an 
issue that will have to be confronted (no pun intended). 
If the Court is unwilling to create a general business records 
exception to Crawford (as it should be, for this would mark a 
return to the ad hoc, fiction-filled approach that is precisely 
what the Court was trying to leave behind in the move away 
from Ohio v. Roberts), what are the plausible alternatives? One 
possibility is for some other expert to rely upon the report but 
not disclose it—to provide conclusions about the cause of death 
but not evidence-based reasons in support of these conclusions. 
While this might fulfill the letter of Crawford, it would be an 
unfortunate result: the jury would be deprived of any access to a 
form of evidence that is far more detailed and precise than the 
testifying expert’s conclusions. Moreover, the expert’s opinion 
would only be warranted if the report itself was warranted; so if 
the report is inadmissible as testimonial hearsay, it is not 
altogether clear we should permit reliance upon it as a sole 
source of information. 
What else might we do? Crawford itself raises and then 
appears to reject the possibility of a special exception for 
coroner statements: the opinion notes, “There is some question 
whether the requirement of a prior opportunity for cross-
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examination applied as well to statements taken by a coroner, 
which were also authorized by the Marian statutes. . . Whatever 
the English rule, several early American authorities flatly 
rejected any special status for coroner statements.”98 
The autopsy example forces us to consider whether despite 
what Crawford says, there ought ever to be circumstances in 
which unavailability and necessity should continue to play a role 
in Confrontation Clause analysis. Perhaps there ought to be a 
kind of “best evidence” rationale for continuing to permit the 
autopsy report even when its creator is unavailable.99 Under this 
rationale, when the person who conducted a forensic test is 
unavailable to testify, the first step ought to be to have someone 
conduct a retest if it is technologically feasible. But when 
retesting is not a viable alternative, ought there not to be some 
way to use the original test in court notwithstanding the absence 
of its creator? 
                                                          
98 Crawford at 46. Indeed, one of the cases discussed in Crawford, State 
v. Campbell, 30 S.C.L. 124 (1844) deals explicitly with information received 
at a coroner’s inquest. The question was whether testimony taken by the 
coroner and put into writing can be introduced at trial without the declarant’s 
presence, and the opinion answers in the negative on Confrontation Clause 
grounds. To a certain extent, this case is not apropos: the issue is not 
whether the coroner need testify, but rather whether the declarant must. But 
it would be interesting to know whether physical findings by the coroner and 
reported upon were able to be introduced at common law without the coroner 
himself. In other words, one possible “out” for some of these scenarios might 
possibly be a turn to history. Perhaps coroner’s physical findings (rather than 
reports of what others said at an inquest) were permitted even when the 
coroner did not testify. 
 However, whatever the history showed, there would be something deeply 
odd about taking an originalist approach in this situation. The kinds of 
physical observations available to a nineteenth century coroner are so 
dramatically different from the kinds of scientific findings offered by forensic 
scientists today that it is far from clear that even if one generally approved of 
originalism as a method for answering such questions of constitutional scope, 
this would be a circumstance where viewing our past traditions as binding our 
present understanding was appropriate. 
99 For an argument suggesting the centrality of a best evidence principle 
undergirding evidence law, see generally Dale A. Nance, The Best of 
Evidence Principle, 73 IOWA L. REV. 227 (1988). 
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I will suggest two possible options. First, perhaps we could 
create the possibility for some kind of pre-trial cross-
examination of the medical examiner. Perhaps after autopsies in 
which the cause of death is found to be murder, there could be a 
public opportunity for a cross-examination of the medical 
examiner who conducted the tests. To be sure, most of the time, 
if no one had yet been charged in the case, it is unlikely that 
anyone would come forward to conduct a cross-examination! But 
perhaps the creation of this pre-trial opportunity, coupled with 
unavailability of the medical examiner at trial, would suffice 
under Crawford to permit the use of the records.100 
Alternatively, and in my view better, especially given the 
problem of the lack of an actual defendant at the time of the 
hearing, we can imagine a narrowly drawn necessity exception 
to the Confrontation Clause in circumstances such as these. 
What if, upon a showing of necessity, the prosecutor were 
permitted to use a substitute expert to interpret autopsy report 
and present it to the jury? The use of the substitute expert could 
be subject to a jury instruction informing jurors that they were 
free to consider the lack of an opportunity to hear directly from 
the writer of the report in assessing the credibility of the 
contents of the report.101 To my mind, this is the more appealing 
approach, because it responds directly to the nature of the expert 
evidence and avoids the partly fictional nature of a preliminary 
opportunity to cross-examine. With a detailed autopsy, in which 
all findings were both carefully documented, recorded, 
measured, and photographed, a substitute expert really is a 
reasonable second-best solution—especially given that the 
                                                          
100 For an argument suggesting the use of such a mechanism in domestic 
violence prosecutions, see Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After 
Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747, 791-94 (2005). Of course, in domestic 
violence cases, there is not typically any question about the identity of the 
alleged perpetrator. 
101 The jury would, of course, be free to consider this point even without 
a jury instruction saying so, and in any event it is not clear that jury 
instructions make a great deal of difference. But at the margins, pointing out 
the unavailability of the original declarant might usefully remind jurors to 
asses the evidence with a critical eye. 
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original expert is not likely to have a significant actual memory 
of the tests anyway. This procedure would protect the 
Confrontation right by requiring the prosecutor to use the 
forensic expert or medical examiner who conducted the test 
whenever it is possible to do so, but would permit cross-
examination of another expert when there was no feasible 
alternative. This approach would not permit prosecutors to game 
the system by choosing their most courtroom-friendly 
technicians instead of the ones who actually conducted a 
particular test. But it would, at the same time, allow some 
degree of practical flexibility in order to continue to put the best 
available evidence before the factfinder in criminal prosecutions. 
This approach, to be sure, is not overtly justified by 
Crawford and Davis, which at present provide no space for 
considerations of necessity, unavailability, or reliability. Staunch 
advocates of Crawford’s new regime might therefore resist such 
a move, as it takes a definite, if limited, step back toward the 
very ideas that Crawford has left behind. But recognizing some 
kind of necessity exception for evidence that, because of its 
expert nature and because of the way that it has been carefully 
memorialized by the original expert, truly can, to a substantial if 
imperfect extent, be adequately interpreted by a surrogate expert 
would be a reasonable way to continue to permit autopsies and 
forensic findings (that cannot be retested), even in the absence 
of the original tester. This approach would represent a narrowly 
drawn and intellectually honest approach to the problem. It 
would recognize correctly that autopsies and other forensic 
science reports are indeed testimonial. It would establish a 
preference for hearing in court from the declarant when 
possible. But it would also allow a second best solution when it 
was both necessary and  justifiable. Surely a narrowly drawn, 
necessity-based, exception to Crawford’s prohibition on 
testimonial evidence would be more jurisprudentially justifiable 
than general and vague pronouncements about practicality, or 
claims of a general (and unjustified) business records exception 
to the Confrontation Clause, or, still worse, the wholly 
nonsensical fiction that expert basis evidence is introduced for an 
ostensibly non-hearsay purpose. 
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CONCLUSION 
More than two years have now passed since the Supreme 
Court dramatically recast its orientation to the Confrontation 
Clause in Crawford. What is most striking in the context of 
those expert evidence issues that intersect with the Confrontation 
Clause is just how resistant lower courts have been to taking 
Crawford at face value. A significant majority of those courts 
faced with questions about the admissibility of either certificates 
of analysis or basis evidence that is produced with an eye toward 
testimony by a person not present in court have resorted to 
strained and dubious arguments in order to avoid restricting 
these forms of proof. 
The Court may well not at all have had the implications for 
forensic science evidence in mind when it decided Crawford. It 
is certainly possible that the justices did not intend to effect 
change in how these forms of evidence were handled at trial. 
But the logic underlying Crawford simply cannot justify a 
wholesale exemption of these forms of proof from the category 
of the testimonial. If it looks like a duck, quacks like a duck, 
and swims like a duck, one ought to have a very good 
justification for determining that the aquatic beast in question is 
not a duck after all. Unfortunately, most of the arguments that 
courts have put forward simply do not succeed in offering 
coherent or logical ways to justify treating forensic science 
reports, other kinds of expert basis evidence produced in 
circumstances suggesting their possible use as future testimony, 
or certificates of analysis, as non-testimonial. 
The argument that basis evidence is being introduced for the 
non-hearsay purpose of helping the jury assess the expert fails to 
recognize that this allegedly non-hearsay purpose necessarily 
requires a preliminary assessment of the likely truth of the 
underlying matter. How can I use the basis evidence for 
assessing the expert without first assessing whether the basis 
evidence itself is worthy of credence? The fact that I may build 
on this first inference about the quality of the basis evidence in 
order to make a second inference about the quality of the 
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expert’s conclusions does not at all mean that my use of the 
basis evidence is for a purpose other than the truth of its 
contents. This approach either misunderstands the definitions of 
hearsay, misunderstands the nature of inferential thought, or 
both. Only if a court can actually detail a line of reasoning for 
which the basis evidence is useful that does not require a 
preliminary determination of its truth ought the courts to be able 
to resort to this argument; at least until now, no court has 
succeeded in doing so. 
The argument that there is a per se business records 
exception to Crawford defies the decision’s internal logic. 
Simply because most business records are not testimonial ought 
not to mean that those few that do that fit the category are 
nonetheless exempt simply because they also fit the contours of 
that hearsay exception. 
While Crawford does lead to some practical difficulties, 
these may often not be so severe as is feared by courts and 
prosecutors understandably anxious about change. And even if 
Crawford is impractical, this does not justify the lower courts in 
ignoring its dictates. To be sure, in those limited instances when 
Crawford may create significant logistical and practical 
difficulties that threaten our process of proof, there may be an 
argument for limiting or rethinking Crawford’s boundaries, but 
this ought to be done both carefully and coherently, not simply 
based on general and sometimes overstated anxieties about 
practicality. 
Arguing that testimony from a substitute expert witness 
avoids a Crawford problem is similarly problematic. Quite 
clearly Crawford prohibits testimonial substitutes in the non-
expert context. A police interrogator’s in-court testimony cannot 
possibly justify the admission of testimonial statements by the 
person interrogated, nor, more generally, can testimonial 
hearsay become admissible just because someone with 
knowledge relevant to the testimonial statement other than the 
declarant takes the stand. If cross-examination of a substitute 
expert is ever to be an option, it must depend on some 
meaningful ways in which expert evidence is distinct from other 
kinds of proof; otherwise, such a rule would virtually swallow 
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Crawford whole. 
Similarly, the effort to exclude “objective” findings from 
Crawford’s purview is not satisfactory. Plenty of non-expert 
observations are descriptive and non-analytical; indeed, as a 
general matter, the rules of evidence exhibit a strong preference 
for factual descriptions by percipient witnesses rather than 
interpretations and opinions. If there is something distinct about 
forensic science reports that might warrant thinking about 
confrontation issues differently in this context, it cannot simply 
be that they are fact-based or facially objective. Moreover, 
delegating to judges the task of separating factual findings from 
interpretive ones goes deeply against the grain of Crawford’s 
reasoning. Precisely the arguments through which Crawford 
resists permitting judges to make determinations about reliability 
as the basis for determining whether confrontation is required 
would caution equally strongly against asking courts to 
distinguish factual claims from interpretive ones to decide 
whether the need for confrontation applies. 
I claim, therefore, that none of these arguments succeeds as 
a justification for finding these kinds of expert evidence to be 
non-testimonial. There is, however, one argument that a number 
of lower courts have offered that is more successful. Sometimes 
the evidence at issue has been produced in a setting in which it 
can be fairly understood as non-accusatorial. When a technician 
fills out a report certifying that she has calibrated a particular 
piece of machinery, or a former gang member describes general 
contextual information about the structure of the gang to a police 
detective outside of the confines of a particular case, it is, I 
think, fair to view this information as non-testimonial, even 
though the words were spoken or written with the clear 
knowledge that they might be useful for testimony at some point 
in the future. The salient difference in these settings and 
analogous ones is that the statements at issue do not relate 
simply to a particular case or incident, but rather, have a 
significantly more abstracted and attenuated quality. While they 
could potentially be relevant to any number of future cases, 
these statements were not made with a view toward any one case 
in particular or any definable instance of wrongdoing. Crawford, 
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to be sure, does not make this question of whether a statement is 
accusatorial explicitly relevant to its analysis of what is 
testimonial. But a limit on the Confrontation Clause that 
emphasized that only accusations, broadly understood, were 
subject to its confines, could be grafted onto Crawford without 
any great difficulty or loss of internal coherence. While this 
modification would eliminate a number of more ministerial kinds 
of expert documents from Crawford’s purview, let me be clear: 
the vast majority of otherwise testimonial expert basis evidence 
and many certificates of analysis could not be excluded from the 
definition of the testimonial on this ground. 
Apart from this possible limitation, I would argue that 
testimonial expert evidence should be recognized as testimonial. 
That sounds tautological, even obvious. And yet, far too many 
courts have refused to recognize the point. There is simply no 
reason why any of these forms of expert evidence should get a 
free pass, or be understood as obviously exempt from the 
Confrontation Clause’s purview. Indeed, often forensic science 
evidence will be the strongest evidence offered against a 
defendant; if we take confrontation values seriously, this may in 
fact be an especially important site in which to assure that the 
defendant has the possibility for cross-examination. 
That said, there may still be both reasons and possible 
methods for dispensing with the confrontation right in some 
circumstances. With certificates of analysis, an important 
question ought to be whether some waiver procedures ought to 
pass constitutional muster. Though I have not considered that 
issue in any detail, it is certainly true that there are many cases 
in which the key issue at trial does not at all relate to the 
reliability of the forensic evidence. To require live testimony in 
every case, even when both parties agree on the forensic science 
facts, may well be a significant waste of resources. Stipulations 
can, of course, be one way around this issue. But it may make 
sense to go further: waiver procedures that would let the 
prosecutor use a certificate of analysis unless the defendant 
requests otherwise could offer a practical way to both permit 
and limit the use of such certificates without any testimony. 
However, the burden imposed on the defendant by these waiver 
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provisions ought to be minimized. 
A second possible way to get around the limitations imposed 
by Crawford would be to create additional pre-trial mechanisms 
for cross-examination. If this made sense anywhere, it would 
likely be in the context of autopsies, in which there may 
frequently be a significant passage of time between the autopsy 
of a victim and the indictment of a defendant in the case. After 
an autopsy found that the cause of death was murder, there 
could be notice of a public hearing in which the medical 
examiner would be available for cross-examination. Would 
anyone representing an uncharged suspect show up at these 
hearings? Probably not, but so be it. By merely creating the 
opportunity, the prosecution could argue that the medical 
examiner’s report should be admissible at trial, should the 
medical examiner herself turn out to be available. 
This potential procedural innovation is, however, more 
clever than useful. It could possibly pass constitutional muster 
under Crawford, but it is an inelegant solution. In practical 
terms, it would simply be make-work for medical examiners, 
while providing little actual possibility of confrontation for 
defendants who were charged at some point subsequent to the 
hearing, and who might not even have been suspects at the point 
when the hearing occurred. To be sure, there is no particular 
reason to feel sorry for the guilty defendant who did not avail 
herself of the opportunity to cross-examine at this pretrial 
hearing because, at the time of the hearing, she had still evaded 
justice or even suspicion, but this pre-trial mechanism would 
offer little assistance to the subsequently-charged innocent 
defendant either. 
The better solution would be a narrowly drawn exception to 
Crawford in circumstances that meet three conditions. When (1) 
the expert who conducted the original test is legitimately 
unavailable; (2) the expert memorialized the results of the 
original test in a form that another expert in the field can 
reasonably understand and interpret; and (3) a retest by an 
available scientist is infeasible, then the courts should permit a 
qualified substitute expert to disclose and to interpret the original 
results for the jury, even though the report itself is testimonial.  
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This solution appropriately balances the defendant’s 
constitutional interest in confrontation with the public interest in 
accurate adjudication. It prevents the state from cherry-picking 
the forensic experts it uses for testimony, or from offering 
critical evidence without any testimony at all. It also recognizes 
that substitute experts are only a second-best solution; when 
possible, the defendant ought to be given the opportunity to 
cross-examine the experts who actually produced the report. But 
it also recognizes that substitute experts are a second-best 
solution. Especially when considerable time elapses between test 
and testimony, the actual expert who did conduct the test is 
likely to lack an independent memory of the tests administered. 
To be sure, this will sometimes hold true for non-experts as 
well: a witness to a crime who makes a statement shortly 
thereafter may, by the time of trial, have little memory of what 
occurred apart from what is captured by the statement itself. But 
in the expert context, a substitute witness with adequate training 
will typically be able to use her expertise usefully to interpret 
the results documented by the original expert⎯perhaps not quite 
as well as the original creator of the report, but well enough that 
we should permit it when necessary. Part of what makes 
someone expert in the relevant forensic field is precisely that 
they have had training in how to produce and interpret such 
reports. Note that I am neither assuming nor presuming the 
reliability of forensic science evidence⎯there have been far too 
many incidents of both innocent error and malfeasance in the 
forensic sciences for their reliability simply to be taken as a 
given. But the shared procedures and routines for documentation 
of results within a particular laboratory ought, at least in 
principle, to make a substitute expert a reasonable interpreter of 
a forensic science report when, and only when, the actual 
creator is unavailable. 
This proposed solution does reflect a certain degree of 
backpedaling⎯a small move away from Crawford, and back 
toward the dual foci of necessity and reliability that Crawford 
ostensibly left behind. It also injects into Crawford’s formalism 
a degree of functionalist analysis⎯but Davis, in quite a different 
context, has already begun to add functionalist inquiries (e.g., 
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what was the primary purpose of the statement?) to the 
Confrontation Clause inquiry. As a practical matter, it is almost 
unthinkable that courts will be prepared to exclude the autopsy 
report from long ago, written by an expert now truly 
unavailable. The real question is not whether most courts will 
find some way to permit such evidence⎯for they almost 
certainly will⎯but whether the courts will make careful and 
intellectually justifiable distinctions in order to permit under the 
Confrontation Clause a limited amount of testimonial evidence in 
delineated circumstances. If they choose instead to rely, for 
example, on the fiction that expert basis evidence is not hearsay, 
or to invent a generalized business records exception to the 
Confrontation Clause, they will be making use of the same kinds 
of inelegant, ad hoc, and jerry-rigged doctrinal creations that 
prompted Crawford itself. That would be both avoidable and a 
shame. 
